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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET BOWCUT (deceased) : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. : 
DON LESLIE BOWCUT, : COURT of Appeals 
Defendant-Appellant : NO. 940361-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DON LESLIE BOWCUT 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on this matter 
pursuant to Section §78-2a-3 (2)(h) Utah Code Ann, 1953, as 
amended• This appeal is from a final judgement entered in the 
Fourth District Court, Case Number 784448131, on May 13, 1994 by 
the Honorable Steven L. Hansen. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue One: Did the Trial Court error when granting 
guardianship to Helen Jensen absent a judicial termination or 
suspension of the father's parental rights? Utah Code Ann §75-5-
204 (Exhibit A). The Appellant will show that proper procedure 
was not followed in the granting of guardianship, and thus the 
appointment of guardian and conservator was invalid and all 
subsequent actions were without standing. 
1 
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Issue Two: Did the Trial Court error in proceeding under 
the parties original divorce action and was there proper 
jurisdiction? 
According to Utah law a custody order ceases to operate on 
the death of the custodial parent, and the court making the order 
loses its jurisdiction over the surviving parent and the child. 
Opinion, Court of Appeals of Utah in Nielson v Nielson, 826 P.2d 
1065 (Utah 1991) (Exhibit B). 
Issue Three: The Trial Court did not appear to make a 
ruling as to Motion To Set Aside Order Appointing Guardian and 
Conservator, Case Number 93340310 (Exhibit C) even though the 
ruling stated that all of the cases and motions would be 
consolidated. 
Issue Four: Did the Trial Court error in not offsetting 
Social Security death benefits minor child receives as a result 
of his mother's death? Utah Code Ann §78-45-7.5(8)(b) (Exhibit 
D). Judge Hansen cites Utah Code Ann §78-45-7.5 (8)(a) as 
evidence that Utah law does not allow a child's Social Security 
benefits to be included in calculating support. Careful review 
of the above entitled Utah law will show that section (8)(a) was 
referring to Supplemental Security Income while section (8)(b) 
clearly states that Social Security Benefits may be used. 
Issue Five: Did the Trial Court error in including the 
defendant's second job in calculating gross income? Utah law 
prohibits the use of a second income if the first income is 
2 
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equivalent of one full time job. Utah Code Ann §78-45-7-5(2) 
(Exhibit D). 
Issue Six: Did the Trial Court error in not taking into 
consideration self employment expenses (e.g. self employment 
taxes and medical education loan payments). The income used to 
calculate the defendant's gross income was derived from self 
employment. Utah Code Ann §78-45-7.5(4)(a) (Exhibit D). 
Issue Seven: Was Utah law followed in calculation of the : 
worksheet to determine the Appellant's obligations to children in 
his present home. The Appellant has three children as a result 
of his second marriage, yet in calculating his obligation to 
children in his present home, credit was given for only two 
children. Utah Code Ann §78-45-7.2 (Exhibit E). 
Issue Eight: Did the Trial Court error in awarding support 
to the guardian retroactive to the death of the custodial parent? 
The Appellant will show that the Utah Supreme Court has found in 
similar cases that the non-custodial parent has no obligation to 
pay "child support" after the death of the custodial parent 
Nielson v Nielson supra (Exhibit B). 
Issue Nine: Did the Trial Court abuse itsf discretion in 
awarding attorney fees to plaintiff. Judge Hansen refers to 
Lynale v Lyngle 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992) as support for his 
decision to award attorney fees to plaintiff. In this case, as 
in cases throughout Utah law, attorney fees were awarded because 
the action was taken to enforce the provisions of a divorce 
decree. The actions taken by Helen Jensen were in fact a 
3 
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modification of the original divorce decree and not an issue of 
enforcement. 
NATORE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The above-entitled case came before the court on March 18, 
1994 for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of who 
should be guardian for the minor child, David Charles Bowcut, and 
how much support should be paid for his best interest and 
welfare. Case number 933400310 wherein Helen Jensen had been 
appointed Guardian and Conservator of the minor child which had 
been contested by the Appellant, and case number 934402209 
wherein Helen Jensen brought an action to enforce support for and 
in behalf of the minor child which was also contested by the 
Appellant, were both consolidated into case number 784448131 so 
that all issues pending before the Fourth Judicial District Court 
regarding the rights of the minor child and the obligations of 
the Appellant could be resolved. At the^  hearing, testimony was 
heard regarding the child's needs and the Appellant's ability to 
pay. The Appellant's counsel brought it to the court's attention 
that there were other issues to be considered but no testimony 
was taken regarding these other issues. The Appellant, in his 
testimony, argued that the court lacked jurisdiction, stating 
that he had been assured by the Utah County Attorney's office 
that case number 784448131 had died with the demise of the other 
party of the divorce. 
4 
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On April 5, 1994, the Honorable Judge Hansen handed down the 
Ruling and on May 13, 1994 the order was filed wherein the 
Appellant was ordered to pay support in excess of the amount 
requested by either the plaintiff's attorney or the guardian ad 
litem. Judge Hansen maintained that he had jurisdiction to rule 
because the minor child does have standing to maintain an action 
against his natural father for support via his guardian ad litem. 
The issue regarding the wrongful appointment of Helen Jensen as 
guardian and the Appellant's request to set aside order 
appointing guardian and conservator was not addressed in the 
Ruling nor Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. David Charles Bowcut (hereafter referred to as minor child) 
was born to Don Leslie Bowcut (hereafter referred to as 
Appellant) and Janet Sue Bowcut on January 31, 1977. 
2. On or about March 2, 1978 a divorce decree (case #784448131) 
was signed and entered where the custody of minor child was 
awarded to Janet Bowcut. 
3. On or about February 5, 1993 Janet Wing (Bowcut), custodial 
parent of minor child, (then age 16), died due to suicide. 
4. Since the death of his mother, the minor child has refused 
to live with his father, Appellant, and his maternal grandmother, 
Helen Jensen has supported him in this decision. 
5 
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5. On or about August 13, 1993 Helen Jensen filed a Verified 
Petition For Appointment of Guardian and Conservator under civil 
number 93340310 (Exhibit F) . 
6. On or about September 3, 1993 Helen Jiensen appeared before 
Judge Guy R. Burningham for a hearing on the appointment of 
Guardian and Conservator. At that time the Court granted Helen 
Jensen's petition and executed the Order in open court (Exhibit 
P.). 
7. On or about October 22, 1993, Helen Jensen, as Guardian and 
Conservator of the minor child, filed a Verified Petition for 
Child Support and Maintenance under Civil number 934402209* 
8. On or about October 29, 1993, Appellant filed an answer in 
civil case number 934402209 in which he alleges that Helen Jensen 
was fraudulently appointed Guardian and Conservator (Exhibit G). 
9. On November 4, 1993 an Order To Show Cause hearing was held 
before Judge Steven L. Hansen regarding jurisdiction, child 
support arrearage, and Appellant's on-going child support 
obligation. 
10. On November 24, 1993 the Court found that Appellant had an 
on-going support obligation to the minor child under the parties 
original divorce decree case number 784448131 and that the minor 
child did have standing to maintain an action against his natural 
father for support via a guardian ad litem, and Ron Wilkinson was 
so appointed (Exhibit H). With regard to jurisdiction, the Court 
found that the Court has continuing jurisdiction to make an award 
of support, pursuant to U.C.A. §30-3-5(3). 
6 
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11. On December 13, 1993 a Motion For Order To Show Cause To Set 
Aside Order Appointing Guardian And Conservator was filed by 
Appellant regarding case number 93340310 (Exhibit C). 
12. On December 23, 1993, a hearing was held before Judge 
Hansen, regarding the status of the case and Appellant's 
financial status for purposes of establishing amount of child 
support. 
13. On January 18, 1994 Appellant filed a request for a Full 
Evidentiary Hearing. 
14. On or about January 21, 1994, Mr. Bowcut filed a motion to 
consolidate case number 93340310, case number 934402209, and case 
number 784448131 so that all of the outstanding issues could be 
addressed at the Evidentiary Hearing (Exhibit I). 
15. On March 21, 1994, the Evidentiary Hearing was held and the 
Trial Court heard argument regarding Appellant's ability to 
provide support, and Appellant argued against the jurisdiction of 
the court to act on the original divorce decree due to the death 
of the custodial parent. 
16. On the 5th day of April 1994, Judge Hansen issued the ruling 
confirming the jurisdiction, consolidating the three cases and 
establishing the amount of child support (Exhibit J). On May 
13th 1994 he signed the Order executing the ruling (Exhibit K). 
17. On or about June 10, 1994, Appellant filed a Notice Of 
Appeal of the Evidentiary Hearing (Exhibit L). 
7 
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18. On or about July 12, 1994, Appellant filed a Petition For 
Extraordinary Writ regarding the appointment of guardianship and 
the November 24, 1994 Ruling. 
19. On or about July 21, 1994, the Utah Court Of Appeals denied 
the Petition For Extraordinary Writ because an avenue of relief 
still remained at the Trial Court level via Rule 60(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
20. On or about July 26, 1994, the Appellant filed with the 
Fourth District Court a Motion For Relief From Judgment on both 
the appointment of guardian and the November 24, 1994 ruling. 
21. On or about August 5, 1994, Mrs. Jensen's counsel filed a 
Motion For Stay Of All Proceeedings And Motion For Joint (One) 
Decision By Judges Burningham And Hansen wherein she argues that 
the issue of guardianship and jurisdiction are now pending 
resolution at the Appellate Court level (Exhibit M). 
22. On or about August 10, 1994, Appellant field an Answer To 
Motion For Stay Of All Proceedings And Motion For Joint (One) 
Decision By Judges Burningham And Hansen And Request For Final 
Ruling wherein he asked the court to rule as to relief from 
judgment so that if relief is given remand can be requested from 
the appellate court, and if relief is denied, the Appellant can 
enter appeals from both orders and have all issues resolved at 
the appellate level (Exhibit N). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant contends that the above matter should never 
have come before the trial court. Immediately upon learning of 
the usurpation of his parental rights by Mrs. Jensen through her 
counsel, the Appellant contested the ruling. Utah law jealously 
protects the natural parent from such actions absent a judicial 
determination or suspension of the fathers parental rights. The 
original ruling is still being contested at the trial court level 
under Rule 60(b)(7) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Appellant 
holds that since Helen Jensen was illegally placed as guardian, 
she lacks standing in the above entitled matter. 
The Appellant further contends that the court lacks 
jurisdiction to make any ruling under case number 784448131 and 
thus both the November 24, 1993 ruling awarding child support and 
the subsequent evidentiary hearing are void. 
Regarding the amount of support awarded the Appellant holds 
that Utah law was circumvented in several instances in arriving 
at the judgment amount. Therefore support, if deemed 
appropriate, should be set at a lower amount and the final 
judgment reduced. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue One: Under Utah law, natural parents have the right to 
the custody and control of their minor children absent a judicial 
termination or suspension of their parental rights. Accordingly, 
upon the death of the custodial parent, custody of the children 
9 
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vests in the non-custodial parent absent the termination or 
suspension of the parental rights Nielson v Nielson supra 
(Exhibit B). 
Further, Uniform Probate Code §75-5-204 states that the 
Court may appoint a guardian for an un-emancipated minor only if 
all parental rights of custody have been terminated or suspended 
by circumstances or prior court order. Utah Code §78-3f outlines 
the necessary procedure for termination of parental rights. 
Grounds for termination are outlined in §78-3f-107. Under the 
Utah and United States Constitution, the moving party must show 
unfitness, abandonment or substantial neglect before parental 
rights are terminated In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah Sup.Ct. 
1982): 
...By the same token, we conclude that the right of a 
parent not to be deprived of parental rights without a 
showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial 
neglect is so fundamental to our society and so basic 
to our constitutional order that it ranks among those 
rights referred to in Article I, §25 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Ninth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution as being retained by the people... 
...It is fundamental to our jurisprudence that nthe 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in 
the parents... and that the parents' right "to direct 
the upbringing and education of children under their 
control"...is protected by the Constitution... 
...No court can, for any but the gravest of reasons, 
transfer a child from its natural parent to any other 
person...since the right of a parent, under natural 
law, to establish a home and bring up children is a fundamental one and beyond the reach of any court... 
In custody disputes between a parent and a non-parent, a 
rebuttable presumption arises in favor of the natural parent 
10 
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Hutchison v Hutchison 649 P.2d 38. Jurisdiction for termination 
of parental rights lies with the Juvenile Court §78-3a-16 (l)(f). 
Fourth District Court of Utah County Case Number 93340310, 
granted appointment of Guardian and Conservator of David Charles 
Bowcut to Helen Jensen. The court procedure as outlined in 
Uniform Probate Code §75-5-207 (Exhibit A) was followed with the 
exception of the requirement of section §75-5-204. Utah law 
clearly protects the custodial parent from termination of 
parental rights without the Juvenile Court, in a separate 
hearing, granting such termination. Utah law does allow the 
custodial parent to irrevocably relinquish parental rights but 
only by certified signing of the proper consent instrument Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3f-114. 
Prior to Helen Jensen's appointment as Guardian and 
Conservator of the Appellant's minor child, neither an act of the 
Juvenile Court nor a voluntary relinquishing of parental rights 
was obtained. Mrs. Jensen's counsel purposefully filed to obtain 
guardianship for Helen Jensen without the benefit of first 
removing the Appellant's parental rights because she knew that a 
move to remove his rights would have erupted a legal battle that 
she could not possibly win. In the process, the natural parent 
was not given even rudimentary explanation of the effect of 
guardianship being awarded — again because a legal battle would 
have erupted. Then, after the 30 day period of appeal had 
expired she finally allows the father of the child (who had not 
sought counsel because of assurance that all actions were taken 
11 
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simply to allow Helen Jensen to register the child in school — 
that no rights had been given up) to know the purpose, intent, 
and legal ramifications of her actions. 
The natural parent is very explicitly protected from such 
slight of hand action by Uniform Probate Code §75-5-204 which 
states that the father's rights must be first taken away before 
proceeding to appoint guardianship. He can willfully waive his 
rights — but only through a semiformal proceeding in which the 
ramifications of his signing is completely explained. 
There is no doubt that Mrs. Jensen's counsel carefully 
orchestrated this deception from the very beginning — thinking 
that if she could keep the ruse up for 30 days after the 
guardianship ruling, the Appellant's constitutional right would 
have somehow expired. Such actions are fraudulent and 
doubtlessly illegal under Utah law yet she maintained in her 
response to the Appellant's request for Summary Disposition that 
they are irrevocable because of a 30-day rule. The Appellant can 
show that he immediately took actions to regain full custody upon 
discovery of the breech of his rights. 
In her response to the Appellant's request for Summary 
Disposition, Mrs. Jensen's counsel maintained that the court 
actions granted guardianship to Helen Jensen while the Appellant 
retained his full parental and custodial rights (see RESPONSE TO 
THE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION Points and 
Authorities, argument III paragraphs 1 and 3 [Exhibit P]). She 
seems to hold that case number 93340310 has placed the Appellant 
12 
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in the unique position of having sustained his full legal 
custodial rights while guardianship is granted to another party. 
Utah law clearly states that such a position cannot exist and 
does not provide for child support in such a position. 
Legal custody according to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-2(14) 
(1953) means a relationship embodying the following rights and 
duties: 
(a) the right to physical custody of a child; 
(b) the right and duty to protect, train, and 
discipline him; 
(c) the duty to provide him with food, clothing, 
shelter, education and ordinary medical care; 
(d) the right to determine where and with whom he 
shall live; 
(e) the right, in an emergency, to authorize 
surgery and other extraordinary care. 
In McLaughlin v. Todd 145 S.W.2d 725, and Barry v. Sparks 27 
N.E.2d 728, the court finds that in the death of the custodial 
parent, the non-custodial parent is immediately vested custody 
and has an obligation to support via common law (thus provide 
food, clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care) 
naccompanying this obligation to support is the right on the part 
of the father to the custody, society, and services of the 
child.n The Court holds that the father has the right to demand 
that the child reside in his home so that he can supervise his 
actions, education and use of support. As early as October 1993, 
correspondence from the Appellant's counsel will show that the 
Appellant was happy to support the child in his home (Exhibit Q). 
The minor child has refused to live with his father and Helen 
Jensen with her counsel has defended his decision. The Utah 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Supreme Court in the case In re J.P. supra gives the following 
opinion: 
Stanley v. Illinois [405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 
31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)] and Quilloin v. Walcott [434 
U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct 549, 555, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978)] 
demonstrate that the termination of parental rights 
solely on the basis of the child's best interest and 
without any finding of parental unfitness, abandonment, 
or substantial neglect, violates the parent's liberty 
right under the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution. Unlike substantive due process cases 
like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 34 
L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), which rely on a "right of privacy" 
not mentioned in the Constitution to establish other 
rights unknown at common law, the parental liberty 
right at issue in this case is fundamental to the 
existence of the institution of the family, which is 
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition,...tt. 
While the illegal appointment of Helen Jensen took place 
prior to and in a different court than the Order herein appealed, 
the Appellant holds that the matter is still relevant to this 
case for the following two reasons: 
1) The Appellant's efforts to contest the appointment of 
guardianship were never ruled upon prior to the evidentiary 
hearing and were consolidated into the evidentiary hearing. 
2) Even without relief from judgment at the trial court level, 
the Appellant holds that the fact that his constitutionally 
protected rights were deprived him in the appointment of Helen 
Jensen as guardian without due process of law warrants the Appeal 
Court's overruling of subsequent actions taken by the illegally 
placed guardian. 
14 
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Issue Two: In the November 24, 1993 Ruling (Exhibit H) 
regarding the Appellant's obligation for child support/ the 
honorable Judge Hansen orders that the Appellant has an on-going 
child support obligation under the parties' original divorce 
decree (case #784448131). He maintains that pursuant to U.C.A. 
§30-3-5(3) the court had continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or arrangements as it is reasonable and 
necessary and may be required in any given case. Against the 
Appellant's argument of improper jurisdiction secondary to the 
death of the custodial parent, Judge Hansen ruled that the 
original divorce decree still stood and that the current actions 
were modifications of that original divorce decree (case 
#784448131). 
In the evidentiary hearing, the Appellant contested the 
trial court's continuing jurisdiction during his sworn testimony 
(see trial transcript page 55 [Exhibit R]) wherein he reaffirms 
that he was told by the Utah County Attorney office that case 
number 784448121 had died with his former wife and could not be 
reopened. 
According to Utah law, in divorce proceedings, a custody 
order ceases to operate on the death of the custodial parent, and 
the Court making the Order loses its jurisdiction over the 
surviving parent and the child. The rights and obligations of 
the surviving divorced parent are those of a surviving parent, 
unaffected by the custody decree entered in the divorce 
proceeding. This opinion, stated by the Court of Appeals of Utah 
15 
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in Nielson v Nielson supra/ is supported by many historical cases 
such as McLaughlin v Todd supra, Barry v Sparks supra, and Mowry 
v Smith, 82 R.I. 82, 105 A.2d 815. 
In Nielson v Nielson supra the Utah Court of Appeals gives 
the following opinion: 
We conclude that the custody order ceases to 
operate upon the death of [custodial parent] and that 
the right to custody already vested in [non-custodial 
parent]. In addition we find that [non-custodial 
parent] is no longer required to pay child support. 
In McLaughlin v Todd, supra, the Court: 
...Held, that so long as the mother lived the 
judgment operated to give her the custody of the 
children, and to compel the father to provide her with 
the means for their support. Beyond that period the 
judgment ceases to have any effect. The father's rights 
over the children being restored, as he is bound to 
provide for all their wants, he is also entitled to 
their care and custody...The order of judgment is only 
to be between the parties—husband and wife. When that 
relation is terminated by the death of either, the 
object of the order and its vitality ceases, and the 
surviving party is restored to his or her natural 
rights. 
...Where court in granting wife divorce ordered 
husband to pay certain sum for support of minor child, 
until death of wife husband's liability for support of 
his child was limited by decree, and on death of wife 
divorce action abated and husband's common-law 
liability for support of his child supplanted decree, 
and chancery court was thereafter without jurisdiction 
to order husband to pay to child's guardian accrued 
installment under the decree. 
Thus, Utah law holds that the Trial Court had lost its 
jurisdiction upon the death of the custodial parent, Janet Wing 
(Bowcut). 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Utah Supreme Court holds in State of Utah Department of 
Social Services v Vigil 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1989): 
...Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority and 
competency of the court to decide the case...personal jurisdiction, on the other handf is the court's ability 
to exercise its power over a person for the purposes of 
adjudicating his or her rights and liabilities. A lack 
of either is fatal to a court's authority to decide a 
case with respect to a particular litigant. 
The Appellant holds that while the District Court is able to 
show that it had jurisdiction as to subject matter in this case, 
it lacks the personal jurisdiction to act upon the original 
divorce decree parties after the death of one of the parties. 
"A judgment is void only if the court that rendered it 
lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties 
or was otherwise incompetent to render judgment." Richins v 
Delbert, Chipman, & Sons, 817 P.2d 382. 
The Appellant contends that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction over the parties of the original divorce decree 
secondary to the death of one of the parties. Under Utah law, no 
court in the state can reopen, revive, or readdress case number 
784448131. 
Issue Three: Approximately six weeks after the appointment of 
Helen Jensen as Guardian of his minor child and immediately after 
learning the ramifications of such appointment, the Appellant 
filed an answer in civil case number 934402209 in which he 
alleges that Helen Jensen was fraudulently appointment Guardian 
and Conservator (Exhibit G). On December 13, 1993 he filed a 
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Motion For Order To Show Cause To Set Aside Order Appointing 
Guardian And Conservator (Exhibit C). 
In his January 21# 1994 Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
(Exhibit I), the Appellant requested that case number 784448131, 
number 934402209, and number 93340310 be consolidated to "avoid 
further confusion, to resolve the issue of who should be guardian 
for the minor child, David Charles Bowcut, and how much support 
should be paid for his best interest and welfare." 
In the April 5, 1993 Ruling (Findings of Fact and Conclusion 
of Law [2]) (Exhibit J) the court agrees that all three cases "in 
which child support for David Charles Bowcut are at issue should 
be consolidated." While the March 18, 1994 evidentiary hearing 
was a vital component to the eventual April 5 1994 ruling, the 
Appellant contends that the ruling was to finally resolve all of 
the previous issues that had been consolidated into case number 
784448131. 
The Appellant contends that a ruling regarding his motion to 
set aside was due after the evidentiary hearing and was not 
given. 
Issue Four: During the March 18, 1994 evidentiary hearing all 
parties agreed that the minor child's Social Security benefits 
that he has received since the death of his mother should be 
factored in somehow in computing the child support obligation of 
the father. Judge Hansen stated to Mrs. Jensen's counsel "you 
don't dispute that that should be considered by the court in 
making a judgment" to which Mrs. Jensen's counsel replied "No, I 
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think it must be considered because that was the point of the 
Social Security system. Was that was [sic] a benefit accrued by 
the mother, that upon her death would be as though she was paying 
child support for supporting him. So I think it should be 
considered and I think it's to the court's discretion how it's 
considered." (transcripts page 18; line 17-25 [Exhibit R}) 
Later all parties discussed whether the Social Security 
payments would be considered as income of the mother which was 
then given in total to the child or whether the amount would be 
subtracted from the total child support obligation, (transcripts 
page 22-24 [Exhibit R]). It was made clear throughout the 
proceedings that the Social Security benefits would be considered 
one way or the other. 
In the April 5, 1994 ruling, Judge Hansen cites U.C.A. §78-
45-7.5 (8)(a) as reason for not considering the Social Security 
benefits. The law reads "Gross income may not include the 
earnings of a child who is the subject of the child support 
award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own right, such as 
Supplemental Security Income". U.C.A. §78-45-7.5 (8)(b) (Exhibit 
D) states "Social Security benefits received by a child due to 
the earnings of a parent may be credited as child support to the 
parent upon who's earning record it is based, by crediting the 
amount against the potential obligation of that parent." 
Thus Utah law clearly does hold that Social Security 
benefits may be used in such cases. Since all parties, including 
Judge Hansen, agreed that the Social Security benefits should and 
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would be considered, the Appellant holds that the trial court 
erred in not considering the benefits. The Appellant finds the 
notion of considering the Social Security benefit as the total 
income of the mother insulting to common sense. Under normal 
circumstances the child certainly wouldn't receive either 
parent's total income, but instead a calculated fraction thereof. 
The Appellant maintains that the Social Security benefits should 
be considered as the mother's contribution to the total support 
obligation. The gross income would then be calculated by going 
back to the Child Support Obligation Table, finding the monthly 
adjusted income that would correlate with a child support 
obligation of $233.00, and then adding that monthly adjusted 
income (which in this case is $1,750.00) to the Appellant's 
monthly adjusted income to compute the final total child support 
obligation. 
Issue Five: During the March 18, 1994 evidentiary hearing, the 
court heard testimony that the Appellant was self-employed as a 
physician and had taken a second job at the Utah County Jail to 
pay his tremendous student loan obligation upon payment becoming 
due. During the hearing the guardian ad litem, acting on behalf 
of the child, asked that the Appellant's obligation be calculated 
using only his private practice income and not his second job 
(transcript page 70, line 8 [Exhibit R]). U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(2) 
states "Income from earned income sources is limited to the 
equivalent of one full-time job.11 The Appellant argues that he 
spends an equivalent amount of time in his practice to other 
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physicians in the area. Because of physicians' extensive weekend 
and after hour on-call obligations, most take the equivalent of 
one weekday off per week. The Appellant took his second job 
during his "day off". 
The Appellant insists that it is not up to the court's 
discretion to decide whether a second job will be included in the 
determination of gross income but a matter of Utah law. 
Issue Six; The Appellant holds that the Trial Court should 
have subtracted his small business tax and medical loan payments 
in computing his gross income pursuant to §78-45-7.5(4)(a) and 
(b) (Exhibit D). Because he is self-employed, the Appellant paid 
$4703.00 in 1993 in self employment tax — i n addition to income 
tax and FICA paid by all wage earners. This is obviously income 
that is unavailable to him and the debt is incurred because of 
his self-employment. Further, the Appellant paid in 1993 
$12808.00 in student loan repayment — debt which again was 
incurred because of his line of work and representing money 
unavailable to him. Thus the court should have based his support 
obligation on a gross income $17511.00 less than the figure used. 
Again, this does not appear to be a matter up to the court's 
discretion but a matter of Utah law. 
Issue Seven: During the evidentiary hearing it was noted by 
both Judge Hansen (transcript page 61 line 8 [Exhibit RJ) and 
Mrs. Jensen's counsel (transcript page 61 line 24) that the 
Appellant had three children by his current marriage and that any 
computation of his support obligation would have to take into 
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consideration his concurrent obligation to those three children. 
With the April 5, 1994 ruling the Appellant received a copy of 
the Child Support Obligation worksheet used to compute his 
obligation. Only two children from his current marriage were 
used in computing his obligation (Exhibit J). While the 
worksheet is only a guideline to be followed by the court at its 
own discretion, the Appellant holds that since the court had 
decided to follow the worksheet the obligation should reflect the 
proper number of children in his current marriage. 
Issue Eight; In the Ruling and Order herein appealed, Judge 
Hansen ordered that the obligation for support be retroactive to 
the death of the child's mother. The court states in the April 
5, 1994 ruling (Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, section 
6) that all parties involved in the matter agreed at the March 
18, 1994 hearing that any modification of the child support award 
should be made retroactive to the date of the custodial parent's 
death. Careful review of the transcripts from the March 18, 1994 
hearing will show that in fact all parties did not so agree. The 
issue was brought up briefly but never resolved, and at no point 
did all parties agree that the obligation would be retroactive to 
the child's mother's death. 
As argued under issue one, custody of the child 
automatically falls upon the non-custodial parent upon the death 
of the custodial parent. In Nielson v Nielson supra, the court 
finds "because custody of the children has vested in Martin, she 
is no longer obligated to pay child support." Mrs. Jensen did 
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not have physical nor legal custody of the minor child until 
September 3, 1993. To make the child support order retroactive to 
a period prior to her appointment as guardian is obviously 
contrary to Utah law. 
Issue Nine; Mrs. Jensen was awarded attorney's fees and court 
costs in the amount of $1105^00 because f,Mrs. Jensen was forced 
to bring the defendant before this court in order to obtain 
support for the defendant's minor child. The court, noting that 
defendant had previously taken the position that his support 
obligation was extinguished by the death of the custodial parent, 
believes the (sic) Mrs. Jensen had little choice in bringing this 
matter before the court in order to obtain the support necessary 
for the minor child, David Bowcutt (sic).,f The court referred to 
Lyngle v Lyngle supra, in which the Utah Court of Appeals stated 
that: 
In this suit, Wife is not seeking to obtain or modify a 
divorce decree but to enforce the provisions of a 
decree she obtained in 1986. In an action to enforce 
the provisions of a divorce decree, an award of 
attorney fees is based solely upon the court's 
discretion, regardless of the financial need of the 
moving party. 
Judge Hansen seemed to justify the award on the grounds that 
the Appellant had refused to pay child support from the time of 
the child's mother's death until court ordered him to do so ten 
months later. Since Mrs. Jensen did not have guardianship or 
physical custody nor had even petitioned for guardianship until 
seven months after the death of the custodial parent — the 
Appellant maintains that he neither had any obligation under Utah 
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law to pay support nor had anyone to pay such support to — as he 
was the custodial parent. 
The Appellant holds that any and all actions taken by Mrs, 
Jensen wherein she would have accrued attorney and court costs 
were taken to obtain or modify a child support judgment. The 
Appellant made monthly payments, despite the fact he had no legal 
obligation, to Mrs. Jensen equal to the amount of the divorce 
decree from the time she obtained guardianship. Her subsequent 
actions were taken to first establish that she had the right to 
demand child support and then to modify the original divorce 
decree so that she could increase the support obligation. In 
Tribe v Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P.2d 213,216 (1921) 
When one party "is compelled to bring proceedings 
against" another to enforce compliance with a divorce 
decree, a trial court may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the moving party so that the party is not 
forced "to fritter away in costs and counsel fees" 
funds received under the decree "by bringing repeated 
actions" 
Also in Stuber v Stuber. 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650, 652 (1952) 
In wife's suit to enforce alimony payments, court 
stated "It was [her ex-husband'sJ failure to live up to 
his agreement which forced her to commence this action. 
There can be no doubt that attorney's fees are 
allowable in actions of this type. 
While Mrs. Jensen's counsel went to great extremes to make 
it appear as though the Appellant was refusing to pay the court 
ordered support, the record will show that in fact the Appellant 
was never so much as tardy on his payments. This was never a 
matter of enforcement and thus the Appellant argues that the 
award of attorney fees is not based solely upon the trial court's 
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discretion. He further maintains that he has incurred several 
thousand dollars expense in an attempt to protect his United 
States and Utah Constitutionally protected rights and thus, upon 
a ruling in his favor, is entitled to compensation for his full 
expenses. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Appellant maintains that the original 
action to deny him his constitutionally protected rights to due 
process of law in the appointment of Mrs. Helen Jensen as 
guardian and conservator of his minor child was performed 
contrary to Utah law, was never accepted by the Appellant, and 
was to finally be settled in the Order herein appealed. All 
subsequent actions taken by Mrs. Jensen against the Appellant are 
without standing. 
Further, the Appellant has shown that Utah law explicitly 
denies the trial court, or any court, the jurisdiction to act 
upon the original divorce decree after the death of one of the 
parties. Both the November 4,1993 and March 18, 1994 hearings 
were without jurisdiction and the fact that Judge Hansen bestowed 
upon his court the jurisdiction citing Faver v Hansen 803 P.2d 
1275 (Utah App. 1990) was in err and did not legitimatize the 
hearing. According to Utah law both Orders are void. 
The Appellant has gone on to show that in setting the 
judgment amount, the trial court exceeded its discretion — often 
directly contrary to Utah law. With the numerous significant 
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errors that were made In the calculation of support, the 
Appellant holds that the Order stands virtually Irreparable and 
thus should be overturned. Should the court be interested In 
justly setting a support obligation, the Appellant maintains 
that the child's Social Security benefit would have to be 
considered, only the primary employment of the Appellant would be 
considered, credit would be given for self-employment taxes and 
student loan payments, the Appellant would be given credit for 
the correct number of children in his current home, and the 
obligation would begin upon Mrs. Jensen's petitioning for 
support. Because all actions taken by Mrs. Jensen were to obtain 
and/or modify a divorce decree, the award of attorney's fees 
should be reversed. 
Lastly, the Appellant feels justified in requesting that the 
Court order Mrs. Jensen to repay the $3750.00 that he has paid to 
her since her appointment as guardian, to pay the trial court 
level costs of the Appellant of $1,550.00, and to pay the appeals 
court costs of $483.50 and attorney fees of $2,000.00. 
DATED this /7 day of August, 1994. 
DON LESLIE^OWOn?^ 
Acting in pro Se 
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(5) Upon acceptance of appointment, written notice 
of acceptance shall be given by the guardian to the 
minor and to the person having his care, or to his 
nearest adult relative. 1985 
75-5-202.5. Appointment of guardian by written 
instrument. 
(1) The parent of an unemancipated minor may ap-
point a guardian by written instrument designating 
the guardian. An appointment by written instrument 
becomes effective where: 
(a) the written instrument is filed with the pe-
tition for appointment of guardian in the court 
having probate jurisdiction in the county of resi-
dence of the last parent to die, if death occurred 
in the state, and otherwise in the court having 
probate jurisdiction in the county in which the 
minor resides in the state; and 
(b) the person appointed as guardian filed in 
the court having jurisdiction an affidavit of ac-
ceptance which states: 
(i) the name, address, and age, or birthday 
if known, of the minor; 
(ii) the name, address, and telephone 
number of the appointee-guardian; 
(iii) the names of the parents of the minor 
and that both are dead or that any surviving 
parent has been adjudged incapacitated; 
(iv) the name of the parent who was last 
to die and the county where that parent re-
sided at the date of his death; 
(v) that the appointee-guardian knows of 
no other appointment of a guardian which 
supersedes the appointment by written in-
strument; 
(vi) that the appointee-guardian accepts 
the appointment. 
(2) The latest document appointing a guardian, 
whether will or written instrument, which is exe-
cuted by the last parent to die has priority. 
(3) Upon acceptance of an appointment, written 
notice of acceptance shall be given by the guardian to 
the minor, if he is 14 years of age or older, and to the 
person having his care or to his nearest adult rela-
tive. 
(4) For purposes of this chapter, "instrumental" 
refers to a written instrument as described in this 
section. 1985 
75-5-203. Objection to appointment 
Any person interested in the welfare of a minor, or 
a minor of 14 years or older, may file with the court 
in which the will is probated or the written instru-
ment is filed a written objection to the appointment 
before it is accepted or within 30 days after notice of 
its acceptance. An objection may be withdrawn. An 
objection does not preclude, after a hearing on the 
objection, appointment by the court in a proper pro-
ceeding of the testamentary or instrumental nomi-
nee, or any other suitable person. 1985 
75-5-204. Court appointment of guardian of 
minor — Conditions for appointment 
The court may appoint a guardian for an uneman-
cipated minor if all parental rights of custody have 
been terminated or suspended by circumstances or 
prior court order. A guardian appointed by will under 
Section 75-5-202, or by written instrument under Sec-
tion 75-5-202.5, whose appointment has not been pre-
vented or nullified under Section 75-5-203 has prior-
ity over any guardian who may be appointed by the 
court, but the court may proceed with an appoint-
ment upon a finding that the testamentary or instru-
mental guardian has failed to accept the testamen-
tary appointment within 30 days after notice of the 
guardianship proceeding. 1985 
75-5-205. Court appointment of guardian of 
minor — Venue. 
The venue for guardianship proceedings for a 
minor is in the place where the minor resides or is 
present. 1975 
75-5-206. Court appointment of guardian of 
minor — Qualifications — Priority of 
minor's nominee. 
The court may appoint as guardian any person 
whose appointment would be in the best interests of 
the minor. The court shall appoint a person nomi-
nated by the minor, if the minor is 14 years of age or 
older, unless the court finds the appointment con-
trary to the best interests of the minor. 1975 
75-5-207. C o u r t appo in tmen t of g u a r d i a n of 
minor — Procedure. 
(1) Notice of the time and place of hearing of a 
petition for the appointment of a guardian of a minor 
is to be given by the petitioner in the manner pre-
scribed by Section 75-1-401 to: 
(a) the minor, if he is 14 years of age or older; 
(b) the person who has had the principal care 
and custody of the minor during the 60 days pre-
ceding the date of the petition; 
(c) any living parent of the minor; and 
(d) any guardian appointed by the will or writ-
ten instrument of the parent of the minor who 
died last. 
(2) Upon hearing, if the court finds that a qualified 
person seeks appointment, venue is proper, the re-
quired notices have been given, the requirements of 
Section 75-5-204 have been met, and the welfare and 
best interests of the minor will be served by the re-
quested appointment, it shall make the appointment. 
In other cases the court may dismiss the proceedings 
or make any other disposition of the matter that will 
best serve the interest of the minor. 
(3) If necessary, the court may appoint a temporary 
guardian, with the status of an ordinary guardian of 
a minor, but the authority of a temporary guardian 
may not last longer than six months. 
(4) If, a t any time in the proceeding, the court de-
termines that the interests of the minor are or may be 
inadequately represented, it may appoint an attorney 
to represent the minor, giving consideration to the 
preference of the minor if the minor is 14 years of age 
or older. 1980 
75-5-208. Consent to service by acceptance of 
appointment — Notice. 
By accepting a testamentary, instrumental, or 
court appointment as guardian, a guardian submits 
personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any pro-
ceeding relating to the guardianship that may be in-
stituted by any interested person or any person inter-
ested in the welfare of the minor. Notice of any pro-
ceeding shall be delivered to the guardian or mailed 
to him by ordinary mail at his address as listed in the 
court records and to his address as then known to the 
petitioner. Letters of guardianship shall indicate 
whether the guardian was appointed by will, written 
instrument, or by court order. 1985 
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/ 
Gregory NIELSON, as Personal Repre-
sentative of the estate of Kirk T. Niel-
son, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
NIELSON v. NIELSON Utah 1065 
Cttea»S26 T2d 1065 (UuhApp. 1991) 
3. Parent and Child *=>2(2) 
Parents have the right to custody and 
control of their minor children over all oth-
ers absent termination or suspension of 
parental rights. U.C.A.1953, 75-5-204. 
Shelly H. NIELSON (Martin), Defendant 
and Appellant* 
No. 900317-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct 1, 1991. 
Mother appealed from order of the 
First District Court, Cache County, John F. 
Wahlquist, J., which awarded custody to 
father. During pendency of the appeal, 
father died. The Court of Appeals, Bill-
ings, Associate PJ., held that (1) custody 
order ceases to operate upon death of the 
custodial parent and court making the or-
der loses jurisdiction over surviving parent 
and child; (2) rights and obligations of sur-
viving divorced parent are those of a sur-
viving parent unaffected by custody de-
cree; and (3) finding in the divorce proceed-
ing that mother was not a fit person for 
the care, custody, and control of the minor 
child was not a determination of unfitness 
which would terminate her parental rights. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Divorce e=»304 
In divorce proceedings, custody order 
ceases to operate on the death of a custodi-
al parent, and court making the order loses 
its jurisdiction over surviving parent and 
the child. 
2. Divorce *=>304 
Rights and obligations of surviving di-
vorced parent are those of a surviving par-
ent, unaffected by custody decree entered 
in divorce proceeding; following death of 
custodial parent, right to custody ordinarily 
vests in the surviving parent 
* Editor's Note: This opinion was originally pub-
lished at 818 P.2d 1043. It is republished to 
4. Constitutional Law «=»82(10) 
Infants *=>155, 156, 157 
Utah and United States Constitutions 
recognize and protect inherent and retained 
right of parent to maintain parental ties to 
his or her child and, under both Constitu-
tions, moving party must show unfitness, 
abandonment, or substantial neglect before 
parental rights are terminated. 
5. Parent and Child <s»2(8) 
In custody disputes between parent 
and nonparent, rebuttable presumption 
arises in favor of the natural parent 
6. Divorce «=>302 
Trial court's finding in divorce proceed-
ing that mother was not a fit person for 
the care, custody, and control of the minor 
was not a determination of unfitness so as 
to terminate her parental rights upon death 
of father, the custodial parent U.C.A. 
1953, 78-3a-48. 
7. Divorce <*=252.3(1) 
Trial court did not err in decreasing 
mother's property award from $26,500 to 
$25,000 upon agreement that husband 
would pay the $25,000 in cash within 30 
days of settlement 
8. Divorce «=>225 
Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying attorney fees to mother based on 
finding that fees were neither justified nor 
reasonable and that father did not have the 
ability to pay the mother's fees. 
Shelly H. Martin, Salt Lake City, pro se. 
A.W. Lauritzen (argued), Logan, for 
plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, Associate PJ., and 
GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ. 
correct a pnnting error. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Defendant, Shelly Martin, appeals from 
the trial court's order awarding custody of 
the parties' three minor children to her 
former husband, Kirk T. Nielson. During 
the pendency of this appeal, Nielson died 
and his personal representative was substi-
tuted as the plaintiff in this action. We 
conclude that the custody order ceased to 
operate upon the death of Nielson and that 
the right to custody automatically vested in 
Martin. In addition, we find that Martin is 
no longer required to pay child support 
Finally, we affirm the trial court's order 
with regard to the property award, attor-
ney fees, and costs. 
Nielson and Martin were divorced on 
March 31, 1987. Three children were born 
to the parties: Brandy, Jacob, and Kasey, 
currently ages 16, 12 and 10 respectively. 
The parties stipulated that Nielson would 
have custody of Brandy and Jacob while 
Martin would have custody of Easey. The 
decree awarded Martin $26,500 plus inter-
est as her portion of the equity in the 
parties' home. In May of 1988, Martin 
filed a petition for modification of the di-
vorce decree, requesting custody of all 
three children and payment of the property 
award. Nielson filed a counter petition, 
seeking custody of the children. While the 
modification proceedings were pending, 
Nielson married Barbara Nielson and Mar-
tin married William Martin. 
On August 7, 1990, the court entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The court found that Brandy would have 
serious problems if allowed to reside with 
Martin and her new husband, that it was 
inconceivable to require Jacob to live with 
Martin in light of his marked antipathy for 
Martin's husband, and that Kasey should 
1. Baram v. Schwartz, 151 Conn. 315, 197 A2d 
334, 335 (1964). See also McLaughlin v. Todd, 
201 Ark. 348, 145 S.W.2d 725, 727 (1940) (Di-
vorce action abates upon the death of a party to 
the divorce); Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173, 
11 S.E^d 782, 788 (1940) C[U]pon the death of 
one of the parties divorced by judicial decree, 
the divorce proceeding falls so far as concerns 
any further right to the custody of children."); 
State v. Superior Court of Marion County, 242 
Ind. 42, 176 N.E.2d 126 (1961) (Although the 
not be separated from her siblings. The 
court also found that Nielson was a fit and 
proper person for the care, custody, and 
control of the minor children. In addition, 
the court stated that defendant, while re-
siding with William Martin, is not a fit 
person for the care, custody and control of 
the minor children. The court awarded 
Nielson custody of the three children. In 
addition, the court ordered Nielson to pay 
Martin $25,000 within thirty days in settle-
ment of the property award. No attorney 
fees and costs were awarded. Martin filed 
this appeal. 
After this case was scheduled for oral 
argument in this court, Nielson died. Niel-
son's counsel advised the court of his 
client's death and indicated that the case 
may be moot. In subsequent communica-
tions with the court, Nielson's counsel, 
A.W. Lauritzen, declined to file a sugges-
tion of mootness. In addition, Martin re-
quested that the court proceed with the 
appeal. Pursuant to a motion for substitu-
tion, Gregory Nielson, as personal repre-
sentative of Nielson's estate, was substitut-
ed for Nielson. During oral argument, 
Lauritzen and Martin informed the court 
that the children presently reside with their 
paternal grandparents. Lauritzen asserted 
that Martin is not entitled to custody of the 
children due to the trial court's finding that 
she is not a fit person for the care, custody, 
and control of the minor children. Martin 
stated that the children have been told that 
she is not entitled to custody. 
[1,2] We must first address the vitality 
of the trial court's custody award in light 
of Nielson's death. In divorce proceedings, 
a custody order ceases to operate on the 
death of the custodial parent, and the court 
making the order loses its jurisdiction over 
the surviving parent and the child.1 The 
trial court in a divorce'proceeding has continu-
ing jurisdiction over the custody and support of 
minor children even after final judgment in the 
action, when a party to the action dies, the 
court's jurisdiction ceases with regard to the 
custody and control of the children); Barry v. 
Sparks, 306 Mass. 80, 27 H.E26 728 (1940) 
(Upon the death of one of the parents, the 
divorce decree ceases to have any further effect, 
at least when it makes no provision for its 
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rights and obligations of the surviving di-
vorced parent are those of a surviving par-
ent, unaffected by the custody decree en-
tered in the divorce proceeding.2 Follow-
ing the death of the custodial parent, the 
right to custody ordinarily vests in the sur-
viving parent3 
[3] The Utah Supreme Court has also 
held that upon the death of the custodial 
parent, the right to custody of the children 
immediately vests in the noncustodial par-
ent under Utah Code Ann. § 75-13-18 
(1953). In re O'Hare, 9 Utah 2d 181, 341 
P.2d 205, 206 (1959). Section 75-13-18, 
which has been repealed and replaced by 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code, provided 
that "[h]usband and wife living together 
are joint guardians of their minor children, 
with equal powers, rights and duties with 
respect to the control and custody . . . of 
their minor children " Although sec-
tion 75-13-18 has been repealed, Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-5-204 (Supp.1991) indicates 
that parental rights must be terminated or 
suspended before the court may appoint a 
guardian for an unemancipated minor. 
Thus, under the current statute, parents 
have the right to the custody and control of 
their minor children over all others absent 
a termination or suspension of parental 
rights. 
[4,5] In addition, the Utah and United 
States Constitutions recognize and protect 
the inherent and retained right of a parent 
to maintain parental ties to his or her child. 
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364,1372 (Utah 1982). 
Under both constitutions, the moving party 
must show unfitness, abandonment, or sub-
stantial neglect before parental rights are 
terminated. IcL at 1375. Further, in custo-
dy disputes between a parent and a nonpar-
continuance beyond the lives of the parents); 
Mowry v. Smith 82 R.I. 82. 105 AJ2d 815. 817 
(1954) (Upon the death of a custodial parent, 
the decree is without effect as to any further 
rights thereunder to such custody). 
2. McLaughlin v. Todd, 201 Ark. 348. 145 S.W.2d 
725. 727 (1940); Stone v. Duffy, 219 Mass. 178. 
106 N.E. 595. 596 (1914); Clarke v. Lyon, 82 
Neb. 625. 118 N.W. 472, 474 (1908). 
3. Brown v. Brown, 218 Ark. 624. 238 S.W.2d 482 
(1951); Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173, 11 
SJE^d 782. 788 (1940); State v. Superior Court 
/ 
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ent, a rebuttable presumption arises in fa-
vor of the natural parent Hutchison v. 
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982). 
The presumption recognizes the natural 
right and authority of the parent to custo-
dy of the child, and 
is rooted in the common experience of 
mankind, which teaches that parent and 
child normally share a strong attachment 
or bond for each other, that a natural 
parent will normally sacrifice personal 
interest and welfare for the child's bene-
fit, and that a natural parent is normally 
more sympathetic and understanding and 
better able to win the confidence and 
love of the child than anyone else. 
IcL at 41; see also Kishpaugh v. Kish-
paugh, 745 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1987); Rasper 
v. Nordfelt, 815 P.2d 747 (Utah App.1991). 
Thus, under Utah law, natural parents 
have the right to the custody and control of 
their minor children absent a judicial termi-
nation or suspension of their parental 
rights. Accordingly, upon the death of the 
custodial parent, custody of the children 
vests in the noncustodial parent absent a 
termination or suspension of parental 
rights. 
[6] In this case, the trial court's finding 
that Martin was not a fit person for the 
care, custody and control of the minor chil-
dren was made in the context of Martin's 
fitness in comparison to Nielson's fitness in 
a custody dispute. No court has deter-
mined that Martin is "unfit" within the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-48 
(1987). Likewise, no proceedings have es-
tablished that Martin abandoned the chil-
dren or substantially neglected the children 
under section 78-3a-48 or Utah Code Ann. 
of Marion County, 242 Ind. 42. 176 N.E.2d 126 
(1961); In re Hohmann's Petition, 255 Minn. 
165. 95 N.W.2d 643. 646-47 (1959); Mowry v. 
Smith, 82 R.I. 82. 105 A.2d 815. 817 (1954); 
Harrelson v. Davis, 415 S.W.2d 293. 296 
(Tx.Ct.Civ.App. 1967); In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 
818. 823 (Wyo.1970). But see Abrams v. ConnoU 
ly, 781 P2d 651, 657 (Colo.1989) (en banc) 
(Death of the custodial parent does not automat-
ically vest the noncustodial parent with custody. 
In Colorado, the best interests of the child are 
the overriding considerations.). 
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§ 78-3a-16 (Supp.1991). Therefore, upon 
Nielson's death, custody of the children 
vested in Martin, and she has an immediate 
right to custody of her children. 
Martin also claims the trial court erred in 
ordering her to pay child support Because 
custody of the children has vested in Mar-
tin, she is no longer obligated to pay child 
support 
[7] Martin also claims the trial court 
erred in decreasing her property award 
from $26,500 plus interest to $25,000. 
However, the parties agreed on the record 
that plaintiff would pay defendant $25,000 
in cash within thirty days in settlement of 
the property award. In view of that settle-
ment, we find no error in the court's order 
decreasing the property award to $25,000. 
[8] Finally, Martin claims the trial court 
erred in failing to award her attorney fees 
and costs. The decision to award attorney 
fees rests within the sound discretion of 
the trial court Morgan v. Morgan, 795 
P.2d 684, 687-88 (Utah App.1990). How-
ever, the award must be based on evidence 
of financial need and reasonableness. Id 
at 688. In addition, we review the trial 
court's award of costs under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Id at 686. The trial 
court found that Martin's fees were neither 
justified nor reasonable, and that Nielson 
did not have the ability to pay Martin's 
fees. The court then found that defendant 
was not entitled to an award of attorney 
fees and that the parties should bear their 
own costs. Based on these findings, we 
find no error in the trial court's failure to 
award Martin attorney fees. In addition, 
we find no abuse of discretion in the failure 
to award Martin costs. 
We have examined the remaining argu-
ments presented on appeal and find they 
are without merit 
GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ., 
concur. 
I KEY NUMttt SYSTEM/ 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jose Richard QUINTANA, Defendant 
and Appellant* 
No. 900264-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct 4, 1991. 
Defendant entered a guilty plea in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Leonard H. Russon, J., and moved to with-
draw that plea. The Court of Appeals, 
Orme, J., held that, even if amendment 
creating a 30-day limit for making motions 
to withdraw guilty pleas applied retroac-
tively, State failed to preserve defendant's 
lack of compliance with the statute as an 
issue to consider on appeal. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Criminal Law <*=>1031(4) 
State's passing reference to statutory 
amendment making 30-day time limit to 
move to withdraw guilty pleas effective did 
not preserve question of timeliness for con-
sideration on appeal, and, thus, even if 
amendment could be applied retroactively 
to bar motion to withdraw guilty plea, lack 
of compliance with statute was not pre-
served for review. U.C.A.1953, 77-13-6; 
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11 (Repealed). 
Connie L. Mower, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, and Judith S.H. Ather-
ton, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appel-
lee. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME, 
JJ. 
* Editor's Note: This opinion was originally puo-
lished at 818 P.2d 1047. It is republished to 
correct a printing error. 
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Minor Child 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
Fii-ED n-lisfa 
four* JudtaSa: D\%vki CowM — 
o! UT?.!". County Si3?o 'M Utah 
C H I V A fc.SMiTH. CiP'V 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In re: DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT, 
an emancipated minor child. 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE TO SET ASIDE ORDER 
APPOINTING GUARDIAN AND 
CONSERVATOR 
Case No. <\&*W° 
Judge: 
COMES NOW, Don Leslie Bowcun and hereby moves the Court for an Order 
to Show Cause ordering Helen Jensen to appear and show cause, if any she may have, why the 
Order Appointing Guardian and Conservator should not be set aside on the grounds and for the 
reasons set forth in the accompanying Affidavit. 
DATED this / ^ day of November, 1993. 
A / - / $Hr ROBERT L. MOODY 
da.misctaioc-bowcucc 
l Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Robert L. Moody, No. 2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Minor Child 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In re: DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT, AFFIDAVIT 
an emancipated minor child. 
Case No. 4 2 * 4 D 2 l ° 
Judge: 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
Don Leslie Bowcutt, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am the father of the above-named minor child. 
2. The minor child's mother died on the 5th day of February, 1993. 
3. Since the mother's death, the above-named minor child has moved on a 
frequent basis and has not stayed in the same home for more than 60 days. 
RUED P\V& 
•J:A- «. CV.-MV St 
•
 C A q « i 6 SWiT^s 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. Upon the filing of the Petition for Appointment of Guardian and Conservator, 
Helen Jensen represented to me that she would see that the child maintained a steady and proper 
home and would further see that said child was properly enrolled in school to enable said child 
to become focused and pursue his best interests and welfare. 
5. That, contrary to the representations of Helen Jensen, she has failed to see that 
the child be properly enrolled in an appropriate school and, instead, is now claiming that the 
child is being "home taught". 
6. It is in the best interest and welfare of said child that he be placed in a 
structured home where he could and would be required to attend a proper school and in a setting 
where appropriate discipline could be administered should he not pursue proper educational and 
vocational pursuits. 
7. That as the father of said child I am entitled to provide guidance, direction and 
the duties now being assumed by Helen Jensen as Guardian and Conservator. 
8. That, had I known Helen Jensen would not bring the focus and see that the 
child was properly enrolled in school and subject to a course of discipline to bring about proper 
goals and pursuits, I would not have consented to the guardianship. 
9. It is reasonable and appropriate that the guardianship be set aside and that 
Helen Jensen be ordered to appear and show cause, if any she may have, why the court should 
not enter an order setting aside the appointment of Helen Jensen as Guardian and Conservator 
and in her place appointing me as the father of said child. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DATED this _ / £ % of November, 1993. 
DON LES 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /A day of November. 
NOTARY PUBUC 
Residing at: Provo, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
wpu iLm t 
'j 
NOTARY PUBUC 
STATE OF UTAH 
"KMT 
OUHNE ANDERSON 
2525 N. Canyon M. 
ProycUtthMWI 
da.miscUff-bowcatt 
3 
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er had been entered. 
Id 1142 (Utah CtApp. 
on (1Kb) of this section 
it regarding impact of 
tupport orders). 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR kuPPORT ACT 78-45-7.5 
78-45-7.4/ Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. ( 1 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of 
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the 
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L. 
I, ch. 214, § 6. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 
itipulation. 
Lrty shall submit: 
78-45-7.5(5); and 
> amount of child 
section (1) is not 
arty's income by 
, may be submit-
r
 only be offered 
accordance with 
the Administra-
tes shall submit: 
ion 78-45-7.5(5); 
)t the amount of 
delines. 
>e used to review 
he parents, 
hild support and 
ed child support 
pport award re-
ceeds the guide-
tion 78-45-7.2. 
or modifying child 
11 present financial 
by Subsection 
vit fully disclosing 
parent, as required 
nd redesignated for-
isection (c). 
's 1989, ch. 214 be-
, 1989, pursuant to 
25. 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
onmeans-tested" government programs. 
^ come from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
t^ime job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Train-
ing Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance; and 
<r\ (c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
5Kma) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
M)e calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earn-
ings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of 
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources 
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained 
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer 
statements and income tax returns. 
665 
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78-45-7.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work his-
tory, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(hi) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to estab-
lish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
asuch as Supplemental Security Income. Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a t may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obliga-
tion of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered 
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. parent, the income shall be based" for "Income 
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5. shall be imputed to a parent based," and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c). 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Modification of award. 
Cited. 
Modification of award. 
When the parties had agreed to the amount 
of child support before the effective date of the 
child support guidelines, the trial court erred 
in modifying child support when no petition to 
modify had been filed and in modifying the 
support amount without finding that a mate-
rial change of circumstances had occurred 
since the previous order had been entered. 
Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (applying § 78-45-7.2(l)(b) prior to 1990 
amendment regarding impact of guidelines on 
existing support orders). 
Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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78-45-7.1 JUDICIAL CODE 
\ U 
mother's health, and set the award at $200 per 
month per child. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Modification of support 
—Divorce decree. 
The divorce decree establishes the duty of 
support the ex-husband owes to his ex-wife and 
a complaint under this section to modify that 
duty of support is improper. Mecham v. 
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977). 
State recovery of assistance to child. 
State, which was joined as a party to the di-
vorce action before court entered order deter-
mining husband's obligation for child support, 
was entitled to reimbursement from the hus-
band for assistance furnished the child before 
entry of the order for support in the amount, 
based upon the relevant factors as set out in 
this section, as set out in the support order. 
Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 (Utah 1979). 
Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
696 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Proctor v. Proctor, 
773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Moon v. 
Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 791 P.2d 895 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, New Standards 
for Child Support Enforcement in Utah, 1986 
Utah L. Rev. 591. 
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adop-
tion of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in 
Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 859. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband 
and Wife § 330 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent 
and Child § 54 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 41 C J.S. Husband and Wife § 48 
et seq.; 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 50. 
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife *=> 4; 
Parent and Child *=» 3.1(5). 
78-45-7.L Medical and dental expenses of dependent chil-
dren — Assigning responsibility for payment — 
Insurance coverage. 
When no prior court order exists or the prior court order makes no specific 
provision for the payment of medical and dental expenses for dependent chil-
dren, the court in its order: 
(1) shall include a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for the dependent 
children; and 
(2) may include a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children 
if insurance coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 13, § 3; 1990, ch. 166, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the sub-
section designations, substituted "is or be-
comes available" for "is available" in Subsec-
tion (2), and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Divorce, maintenance 
and health care of parties, § 30-3-5. 
78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establish-
ing or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable pre-
sumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or perma-
nent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and consider-
ations required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from 
the application 
ted under the 
(3) Awrittenfii 
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\ for those children; 
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s available" in Subsec^ 
iistic changes. 
- Divorce, maintenance 
ties, § 30-3-5. 
ve order establish^ 
after July 1,1989| 
j a rebuttable pjr 
mporary or p e ™ ^ 
the application of the guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebut-
ted under the provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclu-
sion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award 
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or 
not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of 
that parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the 
option of either party be taken into account under the guidelines in set-
ting or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (5). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obliga-
tions of the respective parents for the additional children. The obligations 
shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before de-
termining the award in the instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or 
adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be applied 
to mitigate an increase in the award, but may not be applied to justify a 
decrease in the award. 
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment of the guidelines and 
any subsequent change in the guidelines constitutes a substantial or material 
change of circumstances as a ground for modification of a court order, if there 
is a difference of at least 25% between the existing order and the guidelines. 
With regard to IV-D cases, the office may request modification, in accordance 
with the requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988, Public Law 100-485, 
no more often than once every three years. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, ch. 100, § 3; 1990, 
ch. 275, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment by ch. 100, effective April 23, 1990, re-
wrote Subsection (4), which had read "(a) A 
noncustodial parent's obligation to provide 
child support for natural born or adopted chil-
dren of a second family arising subsequent to 
entry of an existing child support order may 
not be considered to lower the child support 
awarded to the first family in the existing or-
der. 
"(b) If the custodial parent of the first family 
petitions to increase child support, all natural 
born and adopted children of the noncustodial 
parent may be considered in determining 
whether to increase the award," and added 
Subsection (5). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 275, effective 
October 13,1990, in Subsection (1) deleted the 
designation (a) and deleted former Subsection 
(b), which read "Neither the enactment of the 
guidelines or any consequent impact of the 
guidelines on existing child support orders con-
stitute a substantial or material change of cir-
cumstances as a ground for modification of a 
court order existing prior to July 1,1989. How-
ever, if the court finds a material change of 
circumstances independent of the guidelines, 
the guidelines may be applied to modify a court 
order existing prior to July 1,1989," and added 
Subsection (5). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Federal Law. — The Family Support Act of 
1988, Public Law 100-485, cited in Subsection 
(6), amended various sections throughout Title 
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 
et seq. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF: 
DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT 
NOTICE OF FORMAL PETITION 
AND HEARING 
Probate No. 933400310 
Notice is hereby given that on AUGUST 13, 1993, the 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR 
was filed by: HELEN JENSEN. 
A copy of the petition is on file with the Clerk of the Court and may be reviewed 
upon request. 
The petition has been set for hearing in this court at 125 NORTH 100 WEST, 
PROVO, UTAH on SEPTEMEBER 3,1993, 8:00 AM before the HONORABLE 
GUY R BURNINGHAM, COURTROOM #302. 
: CuM^.lt*>m?> 
Carma B. Smith, 
?rk of the Court 
DATED: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
Deputy Clerk 
PROOF OF POSTING AND MAILING 
The undersigned, being sworn, states that copies of the within notice were posted in a conspicuous 
place at the Courthouse and in at least two other places in Utah County, Utah, and that the copies of said 
notices remained posted in such places for ten consecutive days immediately preceding the time for the hearing 
referred to in said notice. True copies of the foregoing were mailed postage prepaid to the persons and 
addresses shown on the mailing list. 
DATED: Qufy. IU>, Pfib VA^uAi43Jofa/lo 
SUBSCRIBED ANDSWORN TO before me this 
/(J> day of UU&'- , 1993. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PROBATE MAILING UST 
DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT, 1404 JORDAN AVE, PROVO UT 
HELEN JENSEN, 1404 JORDAN AVE, PROVO UT 
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT, 1220 E 1200 N, AMERICAN FORK UT 
ROSEMOND G BLAKELOCK ESQ, 2230 N UNIVERSITY SUITE 9-D, 
PROVO UT 84604 y , —^__ yLlS 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
v:;i 
4lH i'i! 
SEP 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
v VJ c . \ • 
3 11 32 * i '93 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
GUARDIANSHIP OF: 
DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT 
' 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 933400310 
DATE: September 3, 1993 
JUDGE: Guy R Burningham 
REPT. BY: Vonda Bassett, CSR 
CLERK: tf 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR 
This matter came before the Court for the above-entitled hearing. Rosemand 
Blakelock was present in behalf of the petitioner Helen Jensen and the minor David Charles 
Bowcutt, who were also present. 
The minor was sworn and testified by direct examination by the Court. 
The Court called for any objections and none were made. Therefore, the Court 
granted the petition and executed the order in open court. 
Letters may be issued. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Rosemond G. Blakelock #6183 
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Cotton Tree Square Suite 9-D 
2230 N. Univ. Pkwy. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: 
DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT : 
An Unemancipated minor child. : 
: LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP 
: AND CONSERVATORSHIP 
Case No. 933400310 
HELEN JENSEN was duly appointed and qualified as Guardian and 
Conservator of the above-named minor child. 
These letters are issued to evidence the appointment, 
qualification, and authority of the said Guardian and Conservator. 
' WITNESS/ my signature and Seal of this Court, this ^  day of 
4 i » Di* 
I l l 
:•» i \j \ \J u 0 i\ \ 
SEP 3 8 so aiH3 
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Rosemond G. Blakelock #6183 
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Cotton Tree Square Suite 9-D 
2230 N. Univ. Pkwy. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: : 
DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT, : 
An Unemancipated minor child. : 
: ORDER APPOINTING 
: GUARDIAN 
: AND CONSERVATOR 
: Case No. 93340310 
Upon consideration of the Petition for Appointment of Guardian 
and Conservator filed by HELEN JENSEN, the Court finds, upon 
hearing, that a qualified person has petitioned for appointment as 
Guardian and Conservator of the above minor, that venue is proper, 
that required notices were given or waived, that all requirements 
for appointment under the Utah Uniform Probate Code have been met, 
and that the best interest and welfare of the minor will be served 
by the appointment of Petitioner as Guardian and Conservator. 
THEREFORE, HELEN JENSEN is hereby appointed Guardian and 
Conservator of the minor, to act without bond and upon 
qualification and acceptance, Letters of Guardianship and 
Alii -jw;. ,.: :.;,\h 
• ftTr,:-. -• ..-.-pf 
>\ 
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Conservatorship shall be issued to,said Petitioner. 
DATED this S day of <^L^&***^n^ 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
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Rosemond G. Blakelock #6183 
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Cotton Tree Square Suite 9-D 
2230 N. Univ. Pkwy. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: 
DAVID CHARLES BOWCUTT 
An Unemancipated minor child. 
ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT AS 
GUARDIAN 
AND CONSERVATOR 
Case No. 93340310 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
HELEN JENSEN states and represents to the Court that: 
1. I am the natural grandmother and custodial party for the 
above-mentioned minor and am interested in his welfare. 
2. The minor's mother is deceased, he does not reside with 
his father and he still has a need for assistance and guidance. 
3. I accept Guardianship and Conservatorship of the above-
mentioned minor and assume all the duties and obligations 
associated with said positions. 
DATED this >? day of 1993. 
7M. 
HELEN JENSE; 
P e t i t i o n e r 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o me b e f o r e t h i s 
4f 
day of 
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JENSEN, individually, : ANSWER 
and as Guardian and Conservator 
of the Minor David C. Bowcut, : 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
DON LESLIE BOWCUT, : Case No. 934402209 
Judge: 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant and in answer to Plaintiffs Petition admits, denies 
and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim against the Defendant upon which relief 
can be granted. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SECOND DEFENSE 
Plaintiff, Helen Jensen, has no individual standing or capacity to bring this action. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
1. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 1. 
2. Defendant admits that Petitioner is the natural maternal grandmother of the 
minor child and further admits that Plaintiff was fraudulently appointed Guardian and 
Conservator on September 3, 1993 which is or will soon be contested and denies the remaining 
allegations of paragraph 2. 
3. Defendant admits that Charles Bowcut was born January 31, 1977 and that 
Defendant is the natural father of said child but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 
3. As an affirmative matter Defendant alleges, upon information and belief, that the child is not 
going to school, is working full time, receives social security benefits resulting from the death 
of his mother, and has become an emancipated person. 
4. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 4. 
5. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 5. 
6. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 6 and as an affirmative matter 
alleges that the minor child has been shifting from residence to residence of duration of three 
to four weeks and has lived in not less than five different residences since March of 1993 and 
as a further aflBrmative matter alleges that Petitioner, contrary to her representations of wanting 
2 
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to provide for his schooling and best interest and welfare, has been unable to or unwilling to 
control and bring focus and order to said minor child's life. 
7. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 7. 
8. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 8. 
9. Upon information and belief, Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 
9 but in the event said child is in need affirmatively alleges that Defendant has always provided 
for said child's support and continues to be willing to provide for said child's support but the 
lack of order and agenda of shifUessness has either emancipated said child or he has become a 
neglected child and his custody should be returned to the father or the Division of Family 
Services. 
10. This Defendant is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the 
allegations of paragraph 10 and on this basis denies the same until evidence can be produced. 
11. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 11 and as an affirmative matter 
asserts that said statutory allegation is inapplicable to the facts of this matter. 
12. Defendant admits that he resides in Pleasant Grove, Utah and is a medical 
doctor but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 12. 
13. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 13. 
14. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 14. 
15. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 15. 
3 
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16. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 16 and as an affirmative matter 
alleges that Defendant is a medical doctor with the ability to provide for the medical needs of 
the child and it is contrary to the best interest and welfare of said child to permit Petitioner to 
go about in a loose-cannon manner without an agenda of focus and control. 
17. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 17. 
18. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 18. 
19. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 19. 
20. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 20. 
21. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 21. 
22. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 22. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed no cause 
of action or in the alternative that this matter be referred to the Juvenile Court for a 
determination of whether or not the minor child, concerning whom this Petition is brought, has 
become emancipated or is a neglected child under the definitions of the Utah Code. 
DATED this £ 5 day of October, 1993. 
ROBERT L. MOOD* / 1 
Attorney for Defendant ^o 
4 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a trae and correct copy of the foregoing Answer, 
this ZITaav of October, 1993, postage prepaid to the following: 
Rosemund G. Blakelock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84601 
^jtlUtt 
da.dhrorce\aiis-bowciitt 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******** 
JANET SUE BOWCUTT, 
Plaintiff, RULING 
CASE NUMBER: 784448131 
vs. 
NOVEMBER 24, 1993 
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT, STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE 
Defendant. 
******** 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on November 
4, 1993 for an Order To Show Cause hearing. Helen Jensen, 
Guardian and Conservator of the parties' minor child, David 
Charles Bowcutt, was present and represented by Rosemond 
Blakelock. Robert L. Moody appeared for the defendant. On or 
about October 27, 1993 Helen Jensen filed an Order To Show Cause 
in this matter. On or about October 29, 1993 defendant filed a 
Motion To Dismiss along with a Memorandum In Support Of Motion To 
Dismiss. On or about November 3, 1993 Helen Jensen filed a 
Response To Motion To Dismiss Order To Show Cause. At the 
hearing held November 4, 1993, the Court heard discussion 
regarding jurisdiction, child support arrearages, and defendant's 
on-going child support obligation and took the matter under 
advisement. 
The Court, having reviewed the above documentation and upon 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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being advised in the premises, now rules as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A Decree Of Divorce in the above-entitled matter was 
signed and entered on March 2, 1978, whereas plaintiff was 
awarded custody of the parties' two minor children and defendant 
was ordered to pay plaintiff $75.00 per child per month as child 
support. On August 3, 1982 an Order was signed by Judge Allen B. 
Sorensen, whereas defendant's child support obligation was 
increased to $125.00 per child per month. 
On or about June 11, 1992 the State of Utah, Department of 
Human Services filed a Petition To Modify on behalf of the 
plaintiff, whereas the State of Utah sought to have defendant's 
child support obligation for the parties' remaining minor child, 
David Charles Bowcutt, increased to $763.00 based upon 
allegations that defendant's income had significantly increased 
and pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6), there was now more than a 
25% difference between the existing support order and what 
defendant's support obligation would currently be under the Utah 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
2. Janet Bowcutt Wing, the plaintiff in the above-entitled 
matter and the custodial parent of David Bowcutt, died on 
February 5, 1993. On or about August 13, 1993 Helen Jensen, the 
maternal grandmother of David Bowcutt, filed a Verified Petition 
For Appointment Of Guardian And Conservator under Civil Number 
933400310. On September 3, 1993 Helen Jensen and David Bowcutt 
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appeared before Judge Guy R. Burningham for a hearing on the 
appointment of Guardian and Conservator. At that time the Court 
called for any objections and receiving none granted Helen 
Jensen's Petition and executed the order in open court. On or 
about September 9, 1993 David Charles Bowcutt, the minor child in 
question, filed an Acceptance Of Appointment Of Guardian And 
Conservator. 
3. On or about October 22, 1993 Helen Jensen, as Guardian 
and Conservator of the minor child David Charles Bowcutt, filed a 
Verified Petition For Child Support And Maintenance under Civil 
Number 934402209# seeking both reimbursement of support provided 
for David Bowcutt since March 1993 and an order of on-going 
support consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines 
from the defendant, Don Leslie Bowcutt, who is the minor child's 
natural father. 
On or about October 29, 1993 defendant filed an Answer in 
Civil Case Number 934402209, in which defendant alleges that 
Helen Jensen was fraudulently appointed Guardian and Conservator. 
Defendant Don Leslie Bowcutt further alleges that David Bowcutt 
does not reside with his maternal grandmother, is not attending 
school and is working full time, and is either an emancipated 
child or is neglected and his custody should be returned to 
defendant. 
4. The Court, having reviewed all three court files 
dealing with the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, is concerned 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
over both the well-being and status of this minor child. With 
regard to defendant's position that his child support obligation 
to the custodial parent was extinguished by the plaintiff's 
death, the Court will refer to Faver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 
Utah App. 1990), in which the Utah Court of Appeals held that a 
child, via her guardian ad litem, has standing to maintian a 
cause of action against her father for support. The Court of 
Appeals further stated that: 
"Utah courts have long held that the right to receive child 
support is an unalienable right, belonging to the child...,11 
In Pur fee v. Pur fee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), a case where 
the non-custodial parent attempted to extinguish his support 
obligation to the custodial parent because the child was residing 
with a grandparent during the school year, the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated: 
,fTypically, child support payments are made to the custodial 
parent because the custodial parent, by reason of physical 
custody, incurs the expenses of caring for the child. A 
trial court may, however, determine that it is in the best 
interest of the child to have support payments made directly 
to a third-party care giver during the child's extended 
absence. A trial court may, on the other hand, decline to 
order payments directly to the third party if it concludes 
that the support paid to the custodial parent will likely be 
applied to the care of the child during the extended 
absence. A trial court therefore has discretion to make 
such arrangements as may be required by the circumstances of 
a given case to ensure that a child receives the support 
ordered.11 
See also Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1992), 
Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981), Hansen v. Gossett, 590 
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1979) (right to support belongs to child), and 
State Pivision of Family Services v. Clark. 554 P.2d 1310 (Utah 
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1976} (child support duty is continuing and right to receive it 
is unalienable)• 
In the present matter, the Court finds that the defendant 
does have an on-going support obligation to the minor child, 
David Charles Bowcutt, and the death of the minor child's 
custodial parent has not extinguished that obligation. Thus, the 
Court finds that David Charles Bowcutt does have standing to 
maintain an action against his natural father for support via a 
guardian ad litem. Therefore, the Court will appoint Mr. Ron 
Wilkinson as Guardian Ad Litem for David Charles Bowcutt, to 
represent this minor child's interests and pursue the issue on 
what defendant's on-going child support obligation is under the 
parties' original divorce case, Civil Number 784448131. As the 
Court believes that defendant's monthly support obligation would 
be subject to modification retroactive to the date the State of 
Utah originally filed its Petition To Modify as Intervenor on 
June 11, 1992, the Court encourages the State of Utah and Mr. 
Wilkinson on behalf of David Charles Bowcutt to pursue the 
original Petition To Modify pursuant to the requirements of 
U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6). 
5. As defendant's on-going support obligation of $125.00 
per month was established in the August 3, 1982 Order which has 
yet to be modified, the Court orders defendant to deposit that 
amount monthly in an interest bearing trust account with either 
his own attorney, Mr. Robert Moody, or with Ms. Rosemond 
Blakelock, who is representing Helen Jensen. The Court orders 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendant and his attorney to submit verification of these 
deposits directly to the Court on a monthly basis. Additionally, 
the Court orders defendant to submit proof of his current income, 
such as a year to date earnings statement and a copy of his 1992 
Federal Income Tax Return, for the Court's review. 
6. With regard to the issue of arrearages, the Court heard 
testimony at the November 4, 1993 Order To Show Cause hearing 
from a Ms. Jeri Ann Brewer of the Office of Recovery Services, 
who told the Court that the $6,653.32 arrearage had been 
previously reduced to judgement. The Court believes that Janet 
Sue Bowcutt Wing's personal representative should proceed to 
collect this judgement on behalf of her estate as any other debt 
owing a decedent would be collected pursuant to the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code §§75-3-703 and 75-3-708. Therefore, the Court will 
grant defendant's Motion To Dismiss as to the issue of the 
arrearages which defendant owed to Janet Bowcutt Wing prior to 
her death. 
7. Pursuant to U.C.A. §30-3-5(3), this Court has 
continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
arrangements as is reasonable and necessary and may be required 
in any given case to ensure that a minor child receives the 
support he or she is entitled to. Therefore, the Court will set 
a special review hearing in the above entitled matter to 
determine the status and needs of David Charles Bowcutt as well 
as defendant's current income level. Because the Court is aware 
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that a conflict of interest may exist concerning the Court's 
appointment of Mr. Ron Wilkinson as David Bowcutt's Guardian Ad 
Litem and Mr. Robert Moody's representation of the defendant, the 
Court is willing to entertain discussion from all parties and 
counsel regarding that issue at the review hearing. In order to 
accommodate all counsel's schedules, the Court will have counsel 
contact this office at 429-1008 within ten (10) days of the date 
of this ruling to set a time for this review hearing. 
cc: Rosemond Blakelock 
Robert Moody 
Ron Wilkinson 
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET BOWCUT, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON LESLIE BOWCUT, 
Defendant. : Judge Hansen 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff in Case No. 784448131 died on the 5th day of February, 1993. 
2. Helen Jensen, the maternal grandmother of the Plaintiff, was appointed 
guardian and conservator under Civil No. 933400310. An objection to this appointment was 
filed by the Defendant, Donald Bowcut. 
3. On or about October 22, 1993, Helen Jensen filed a petition for child support 
and maintenance under Civil No. 934402209. Defendant filed an answer. 
1 
c . r v ? ; p;« r>: CO 
Case K^784448131 
9344022D9Tana-9334t)0310 
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4. On November 24, 1993, Judge Steven L. Hansen entered a ruling in Case No. 
784448131 after considering all three cases and, in addition thereto, made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law without the benefit of having any evidence. 
5. The minor child, David Charles Bowcut, has a right to be supported. 
6. The Defendant, Don Leslie Bowcut, has a duty to support the child. 
7. The minor child, David Charles Bowcut, has an entitlement because of his 
mother's death to Social Security benefits. 
8. The minor child is employed and has earnings of his own. 
POINT ONE 
ALL CASES SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED. 
There are currently three cases pending before the Fourth Judicial District Court 
with regard to the rights of the minor, David Charles Bowcut, and the obligations of Don Leslie 
Bowcut. In Case No. 784448131, the Plaintiff is deceased. In Case No. 934402209, a duly 
appointed guardian has brought an action to enforce support for and in behalf of the minor, 
David Charles Bowcut. Don Leslie Bowcut has contested the guardianship of Helen Jensen in 
Case No. 933400310. All of these cases involve the same parties, the same issues, and 
consolidation will avoid confusion and unnecessary, multiple litigation. 
2 
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CONCLUSION 
The above-numbered cases should be consolidated to avoid further confusion, to 
resolve the issue of who should be guardian for the minor child, David Charles Bowcut, and 
how much support should be paid for his best interest and welfare. Consolidation will also 
avoid unnecessary confusion on the parts of the litigants, counsel, and the court. 
DATED this uj*=> day of January, 1994. 
ROBERT L. MOOtyY 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, this 20 day of January, 1994, postage prepaid to 
the following: 
Rosemund G. Blakelock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84601 
da.divorcc\meiii-bowcat.2 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C0tM^^ - •**? 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH J ^ 
JANET SUE BOWCUTT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT, 
Defendant. 
******** 
RULING 
CASE NUMBER: 784448131 
APRIL 5, 1994 
STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE 
******** 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 18, 
1994 for an evidentiary hearing regarding the defendant's child 
support obligation for the parties' minor child, David Charles 
Bowcutt. Helen Jensen, maternal grandmother, Guardian and 
Conservator for the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, was 
present and represented by Rose Blakelock. Defendant was present 
and represented by Robert Moody. Ron Wilkinson, Guardian Ad 
Litem for David Charles Bowcutt, was also present. At that time, 
the Court heard discussion and testimony regarding defendant's 
ability to provide support for the minor child and the minor 
child's status and needs for support and took the matter under 
advisement. 
On December 23, 1993 attorneys Rose Blakelock, Robert Moody, 
John Musselman, and Ron Wilkerson appeared before Judge Steve L. 
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Hansen for an Order To Show Cause hearing. At that time, the 
Court ordered that a child support order was to be in the file 
within thirty days and the order would be retroactive to the 
Petition To Modify. On or about January 18, 1994 defendant filed 
a Request For Full Evidentiary Hearing. On or about January 21, 
1994 defendant filed a Motion To Consolidate along with a 
Memorandum Of Points And Authorities. On January 27, 1994 an 
Order On Hearing was signed and entered by the Court. On or 
about February 3, 1994 Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator of 
David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Motion In Support Defendant's 
Motion To Consolidate and a Motion In Support Defendant's Request 
For Full Evidentiary Hearing, Request For Information On 
Defendant's Income, And Motion For Compliance With Court's Order 
Of December 3, 1993. On or about March 8, 1994 Helen Jensen, 
Guardian and Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Notice 
To Submit and on March 18, 1994, Mrs. Jensen's counsel filed an 
Affidavit In Support Of Attorney's Fees. 
The Court, having reviewed the above documentation and the 
Court's tape record of the March 18, 1994 hearing, and upon being 
advised in the premises, now rules as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A Decree Of Divorce in the above-entitled matter was 
signed and entered on March 2, 1978, whereas plaintiff, Janet 
Bowcutt, was awarded custody of the parties' two minor children 
and defendant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of 
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$75.00 per month per child. On August 3, 1982 the Court entered 
an Order, whereas defendant7s child support obligation was 
increased to $125.00 per month per child. 
On or about June 11, 1992 the State of Utah, Department of 
Human Services filed a Petition To Modify on behalf of plaintiff, 
Janet Bowcutt. At that time the State of Utah sought to increase 
defendant's child support obligation from $125.00 per month to 
$763.00 pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6). 
On February 5, 1993, Janet Bowcutt, plaintiff and custodial 
parent of David Charles Bowcutt, died due to suicide. On or 
about August 13, 1993, Helen Jensen, maternal grandmother of 
David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Verified Petition For Appointment 
Of Guardian And Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt and on 
September 3, 1993 Helen Jensen was appointed as David Charles 
Bowcutt's Guardian and Conservator by Judge Guy R. Burningham. 
This matter came before the Court on November 4, 1993 for an 
Order To Show Cause hearing brought by Helen Jensen, Guardian and 
Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt, who was seeking child 
support from the defendant on behalf of the minor child. The 
Court issued a Ruling on November 24, 1993, whereas the Court 
found that defendant did have an on-going support obligation to 
David Charles Bowcutt and ordered that defendant place $125.00 
per month in an interest bearing trust account pending final 
resolution of this matter, that the $6,653,00 child support 
arrearage previously reduced to judgement be collected by Janet 
Bowcutt Wing's personal representative pursuant to the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code, and that a special review hearing be set 
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for the limited purpose of determining David Charles Bowcutt7s 
status and needs as well determining the defendants present 
income. Additionally, the Court appointed Mr. Ron Wilkerson as 
David Charles Bowcutt7s Guardian Ad Litem. 
2. With regard to defendant7s Motion To Consolidate filed 
on or about January 21, 1994, the Court agrees that all three 
cases, Civil Number 934402209, Civil Number 93400310, and Civil 
Number 784448131, in which child support for David Charles 
Bowcutt are at issue should be consolidated. The Court notes 
that it previously directed Mr. Ron Wilkerson in the Ruling 
issued November 24, 1993 to proceed on this matter under the 
parties7 original divorce action, Civil Number 784448131, based 
upon the Court7s determination that modification of defendant7s 
monthly child support obligation to David Charles Bowcutt would 
be retroactive to the date the State of Utah filed its Petition 
To Modify As Intervenor on June 11, 1992. For clarification 
purposes, the Court consolidates the other two cases into Civil 
Number 784448131. Counsel is directed to file all documents 
pertaining to this matter in Civil Number 784448131 pursuant to 
the Court7s previous finding that based upon Utah Court of 
Appeals7 decision in Faver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 (Utah App. 
1990), David Charles Bowcutt, via his Guardian Ad Litem, does 
have standing to maintain an action against his natural father 
for support. 
3, With regard to a determination of defendant7s present 
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income, the Court finds that defendant is a physician who earned 
$62,257.26 from his medical practice in 1993 and also earned an 
additional $21,845.00 in 1993 from a contract with Utah County 
for the provision of medical services to the Utah County Jail for 
a total earnings of $84,102.26 in 1993. See 1993 Miscellaneous 
Income Forms of Dr. Don L. Bowcutt. 
Defendant maintains that pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(2), 
his earnings from his medical practice should be viewed as "one 
full-time job11 to be used in calculating his child support 
obligation for David Bowcutt and that his earnings resulting from 
his contract with Utah County should be treated as over-time 
earnings and excluded from calculating gross income for purposes 
of determining child support. 
Helen Jensen, acting in her capacity as David Bowcutt's 
Guardian and Conservator, maintains that defendant, as a medical 
doctor is a professional and that all income resulting from his 
practice of medicine, regardless of where that practice occurs, 
should be utilized by the Court in calculating defendant's child 
support obligation to David. 
Pursuant to U.C.A §78-45-7(3), the Court in determining the 
appropriate amount of support, must consider all relevant 
factors, including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and obligee for the 
support of others. 
The Court, noting that defendant has completed his professional 
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education and developed a medical practice subsequent to the 
August 3, 1982 Order which modified his support obligation to 
$125.00 per month per child, finds that defendant is engaged in a 
medical practice that includes providing his services as a 
physician to the Utah County Jail as well as his practice with 
Dr. Bell. The Court, in considering defendant's present income 
level, standard of living, and relative wealth as well as the low 
level of support that defendant has historically provided for 
this minor child, will elect to utilize all of defendant's 
earnings resulting from his practice of medicine in determining 
defendant's present income level. Therefore, the Court finds 
that defendant's average monthly gross income is $7,008.52 based 
upon his gross 1993 income of $84,102.26. ($62,257.26 Earnings 
From Medical Practice With Carl T. Bell, M.D. + $21,845.00 
Earnings From Utah County = $84,102.26 1993 Gross Income). 
($84,102.26 1993 Gross Income -^  12. = $7,008.52 Average Gross 
Monthly Income). 
4. With regard to the issue of the needs and status of the 
minor child, David Bowcutt, the Court heard testimony from Mrs. 
Jensen at the March 18, 1994 hearing as to actual expenses she 
has incurred for the care and support of David. It is 
uncontroverted that David has resided with other third parties, 
specifically the Tom Prentice family and his sister, Wendy, as 
well as Mrs. Jensen during the time period following his mother's 
death in February of 1993. Mrs. Jensen testified that she has 
paid money to those other third parties that David has 
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periodically resided with for his support, specifically giving 
Tom Prentice $1,500.00 in September of 1993 for food and support 
provided to David- While Mrs. Jensen was unable to provide the 
Court with detailed information on the exact amount of funds she 
has expended in Davids behalf, she estimated that she has 
expended approximately between $250.00 and $500.00 per month for 
David7s needs, such as food, clothing, medical expenses, 
transportation costs, shelter, and other miscellaneous needs. 
Additionally, it is uncontroverted that David is currently 
receiving $233.00 per month entitlement from Social Security due 
to his mothers death. Mrs. Jensen testified that the Social 
Security benefit is deposited directly in David's own bank 
account and that he has been using those funds for recreation and 
miscellaneous needs. Mrs. Jensen further testifies that she has 
had no access to or control over the Social Security entitlement 
David receives and that those funds have not been used for 
David's care and support. The Court also heard testimony that 
David is not employed as defendant has alleged and has no other 
income separate from his Social Security entitlement. 
Additionally, the Court heard testimony from the defendant 
at the March 18, 1994 hearing as to his belief that monthly 
expenses attributable for the care and support of a seventeen 
year old boy such as David would be in the range of $500.00 per 
month. 
Although defendant is financially secure and capable of 
providing support for David, he maintains that the Social 
Security entitlement David receives should be factored in by the 
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Court in determining defendant support obligation- Pursuant to 
U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(8)(a), such benefit to a child in the child's 
own right, may not be included in gross income for purposes of 
calculating child support. Thus, the Court will riot offset 
defendant's support obligation with the Social Security death 
benefits David receives as a result of his mother's death. 
5. The Court, noting that defendant presently has two 
minor children with his present spouse for which he provides the 
sole support for, will allow defendant credit for his support 
obligation for those children. Thus, the Court will allow 
defendant a credit a $1,157.00 for his support obligation to his 
younger minor children pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(4)(a),(b), 
the Worksheet To Determine Father's Obligation To Children In His 
Present Home, and the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Table 
set forth in U.C.A. §78-45-7.14. (See Attachment A). 
Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6), a difference of at least 
25% between the existing child support order and what the child 
support obligation would be under the Utah Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines utilizing the parties' current incomes constitutes a 
material change of circumstances that would justify the Court 
modifying an existing child support order. Thus, based upon 
defendant's gross monthly income of $7,008.52 and the $1,157.00 
credit for the children in his present home, the Court finds that 
a difference of more than 25% does exist between defendant's 
existing support obligation and what his support obligation would 
be under the present Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
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($596-00 - $125.00 = $471.00 -5- $596.00 = .79%). Therefore, the 
Court will modify defendant's child support obligation for David 
Charles Bowcutt to $596.00 per month. (See Attachment B)• 
6. With regard to the issue of whether the modification of 
defendant's child support obligation should be retroactive to the 
date the State of Utah filed a Petition To Modify on June 11, 
1992 as Intervenor on behalf of the custodial parent, Janet 
Bowcutt Wing, who had sought public assistance for the minor 
child, the Court will refer to U.C.A. §30-3-10.6(2) which states: 
"A child or spousal support payment under a child support 
order may be modified with respect to any period during 
which a petition for modification is pending, but only from 
the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee, 
if the obligator is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if 
the obligee is the petitioner." 
Although the Court would be inclined to make the modification of 
defendant's child support obligation retroactive to the date the 
State of Utah filed its Petition, the Court notes that no Return 
Of Service for defendant was ever filed in this matter, although 
plaintiff Janet Bowcutt Wing was served with the State Of Utah's 
Petition To Modify and an appropriate Return Of Service was 
filed. However, the Court notes that all parties involved in 
this matter, Mrs. Jensen, the defendant, and Mr. Wilkerson, the 
Guardian Ad Litem agreed at the March 18, 1994 hearing that any 
modification of the child support award should be made 
retroactive to the date of the custodial parent's death. 
Therefore, based upon that the parties' agreement as to when the 
modification of defendant's child support obligation should take 
effect presented to the Court at the March 18, 1994 hearing, the 
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Court will order the modification retroactive to February 5, 
1993, the date of Janet Bowcutt Wing's death. 
Defendant is entitled to a credit against child support 
arrearages resulting from the retroactive modification for the 
$250.00 that he paid directly to Mrs. Jensen in November of 1993 
and for the amounts that have been deposited into Mr. Moody's 
trust account subsequent to the Court's previous Ruling issued 
November 24, 1993. The funds currently being held in Mr. Moody's 
trust account are to be turned over to Mrs. Jensen and an 
appropriate Judgement for any amounts in arrearage will be 
entered against the defendant and awarded to Mrs, Helen Jensen, 
Guardian and Conservator for David Charles Bowcutt. 
7. Pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals decision in 
Purfee v. Purfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), regarding the 
trial court's discretion to make such arrangements as may be 
required by the circumstances of a given case to ensure that a 
child receives the support ordered, the Court will order that 
defendant make the child support payment directly to Mrs. Helen 
Jensen, Guardian and Conservator for Pavid Charles Bowcutt. 
Mrs. Jensen may disperse these funds to herself and other 
third parties, such as the Prentice family, with whom Pavid has 
been residing with periodically and who are engaged in providing 
Pavid with the care and support necessary for a seventeen year 
old boy. The Court further orders Mrs. Jensen to submit to the 
Court on a quarterly basis, a detailed accounting of how the 
child support award is being expended on Pavid's behalf. 
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A d d i t j i i h c i I II | I II in i I i n I lull i in II ill i • in in in ill Mi s Jensen that these funds 
are not to be turned over directly t David ^ " c e at his 
discretion. This child support award j «•- •-£ ased by Mrs, 
Jensen and the other l.lmi.l pciilj sdi i in,;i ass 1 si" i m\ 
Mrs, Jensen iII providing a home for David for reimbursement for 
the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred providing care, 
support, and a home for this minor chi. - fJiiriJiini I uiids 
may be turned over to David upon him attaining majority, 
8. Additionally, the Court !c gravely concerned over the 
emotional needs and well-being : .nis younq man, David Bowcutt. 
Tlii i, I,, u a r I I, 11;»! ,ci i i, I i • • nsrM'ii I I in defendant and 
Mr. W i l k e r s o n , David's Guardian -• Litem at the March „. 1 -Q^  
hearing that David is a young m. *rtio appears at t::i mes to be out 
of control, tr oubled, and 
helping deal with the trauma he has suffered as a result of the 
ci i cumstances of h i s mother's death. The Court, noting that the 
parties are before him solely for the purpose >]• deie»«" »"«« i the 
child's needs and defendant's present income, does nc* 
der David L O 
participate in therapy. In the event that Mrs.,, 3 ensen, as 
David's Guardia * Wilkerson, as David's Guardian Ad Litem, 
II Il i indped N i iii I M v i rill" i lip 1 i nit ^ rest 
to seek therapeutic assistance, then they may refer the matter to 
Divisior Family Services an investigation and possible 
referral : * .• j u v e n n egardless < whetne: 
decides participate therapy voluntarily : Is eventually 
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court ordered to do so, defendant will be responsible for all 
costs associated with such therapy for David Bowcutt. 
9. With regard to the issue of an award of attorney fees 
and costs in this matter, the Court notes that Mrs. Jensen filed 
an Affidavit In Support Of Attorney,s Fees on or about March 18, 
1994 and defendant filed an Objection To Affidavit In Support Of 
Attorney Fees on or about March 25, 1994. 
The Court will refer to Lynale v. Lvnale. 831 P.2d 1027 
(Utah App. 1992), in which the Utah Court of Appeals stated that: 
"In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree, 
an award of attorney fees is based solely upon the trial 
court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the 
moving party." 
In the above-entitled matter, Mrs. Jensen was forced to bring the 
defendant before this Court in order to obtain support for 
defendant's minor child. The Court, noting that defendant had 
previously taken the position that his support obligation was 
extinguished by the death of the custodial parent, believes the 
Mrs. Jensen had little choice in bringing this matter before the 
Court in order to obtain the support necessary for the minor 
child, David Bowcutt. Thus, upon review of the Affidavit In 
Support Of Attorney's Fees filed by Ms. Blakelock on or about 
March 18, 1994, the Court will elect to award Mrs. Jensen 
$1,000.00 in attorney fees and $105.00 for costs associated in 
pursuing this matter. Appropriate judgement against the 
defendant may be entered. 
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10. Counsel for Mrs. Jensen is directed to prepare an 
appropriate order consistent with the aforementioned ruling. 
DATED at Provo, Utah this £- day of April, 1994 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Rosemond Blakelock 
Robert Moody 
Ron Wilkerson 
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ATTACHMENT "B" 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH 
•1ANM SUE BOWCUTT 
vs. 
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT 
. COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKS 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNTTi 
Gvil No. 784448131 
C *>& 
L Enter the combined number of natural and adopted children of thismother 
and father. 
2a, Enter the factor's and mother's gross monthly income 
Refer to Ihstrucaons for definition of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony thai is aomHypaid. 
(Do not enter alimony ordered fbr this case). 
/ I S O 
-0> 7,008.52 
5'tA O $<=>> 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support* (Do na enter obligations 
ordered for the children in this case). 
2d. Optional: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in Present Home 
WcMisiiftcr for either merit. 
1 SobcactIine2b^2c>aiid21fiom23L This is tteAdjusred Monthly 
Gross for child support pgrocacL 
4 . Take the COMBINED figm»mTm»3?r»ri ff^imwih^^rfrtftfrwt jij T W 
1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support ObSgarioa. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by ifce COMBINED 
adiuscd monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Moitipiy Line 4 by Line 5 fhr each parent © obtain each parents share of 
die Base Support Obligation. -0- 59.6.00 Btatt 
gmer thg ehilrirgn'g pnrriati t%f itmmhJy m*ftir*l smi A*m\ mw-n*'-
\ paid to in mi ancr oinoany, 
S. Enter the monthly 
the children in Line 1* 
or trazmnf relaxed chSd care fixite 
9. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Bring down the jmuunt in Line 6 6br the Obligor parent. 596.00 
UL Adjusted Base Child Support Award 
SubcaatbeObfi_qrtIine7ftomLaic9. 
1L Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child 
Divide Line 10 by Line L 
12. CHILD CARE A WARD 
Multiply Line S by -50 to obtain obligor's share of child care «pm<r, Add to Line 10 only 
**cn w wnrc fr amallv TCnal 
® 
fl^V v;w vv o^/ 
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Iipr 
IN THE' FOURTH 
-&%<** 
DISTRICT COURT 
^0% 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET SUE BOWCUTT 
vs. 
Don LESLIE BOWCUTT 
7 
"2 
J 
) 
) • 
) 
) 
) 
I 
WORKSHEET TO DETERMINE FATHERS 
OBUGATIONSTO CHILDREN IN HIS 
$ PRESENT HOME 
:^f^?>°r^Mo, 784448131 
D^ e>^) 
Current S excuse's Name 
Current 
Spouse Father Combinec 
1. Enter the number of natural and adopted children of the father and 
his current spouse in the home. ft^^PSvfevra'iSS3 
2a. Enter the father's and his current spouse's gross monthly income. 
See instructions for definition of income. -0- 7,008.52 
:^w<i>Sw: i$>^^^ 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony actually paid. 
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case). |fe-»*>tt^?:M*w&>x-x«'H5«: 
2c. Enter pre-existing ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations 
ordered for the children in this case). IngniH 
3. Subtract Line 2b and 2c from Line 2a. This is the Adjusted Monmly 
Gross for child support purposes. -0- 7,008.52 7,008.52 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and me number of children in Line 
1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support Obligation. 1,157.00 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED 
adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of 
the Base Support Obligation. 
7. Enter the monthly uninsured medical expenses for the children in l ine i . 
8. Enter the monthly work or training related child care expenses for the 
the children in Line 1. 
FATHER'S SHARE OF BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD FOR THE CHILDREN IN 
LINE L Enter the amount for the father from Line 6. 
10. FATHER'S SHARE OF UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES OF THE CHILDREN 
IN LINE L Multiply the amount in Line 7 by a proposed ratio, and enter result here. 
11. FATHER'S SHARE OF WORK OR TRAINING RELATED CHILD CARE EXPENSE 
OF THE CHILDREN IN LINE L Multiply Line 3 by J50, and enter result here. 
12. FATHER'S SHARE OF TOTAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TO THE 
CHILDREN IN LINE L Add Lines 9,10, and 11. This amount may be used to adjust the 
father's gross income on the sole, split or joint custody worksheets. 1,157.00 
'V A T 
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ROSEMOND BLAKELOCK #6183 
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET SUE BOWCUTT, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT, : 
Defendant. : 
: ORDER ON RULING: 
: CHILD SUPPORT 
Case No. 784448131 
: Judge Steven L. Hansen 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on an Evidentiary Hearing 
regarding the Defendant's child support obligation for the parties' 
minor child, David Charles Bowcutt. Helen Jensen, maternal 
grandmother, Guardian and Conservator for the minor child, David 
Charles Bowcutt, was present and represented by Rosemond Blakelock. 
Defendant was present and represented by Robert Moody. Ron 
Wilkerson, Guardian Ad Litem for David Charles Bowcutt, was also 
present. At that time the court heard discussion and testimony 
regarding the Defendant's ability to provide support for the minor 
child and the minor child's status and needs for support and took 
the matter under advisement. 
Subsequently, the Court having reviewed the documentation, 
considered all the evidence, and being fully advised in the 
c':i;YM3 F'rtV-U2 
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premises, issued Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law. 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law, 
the Court makes the following: 
ORDER 
1. The Court orders the consolidation of case number 
934402209, Case Number 93440310 and Case Number 784448131 
consolidated into one number, Case Number 784448131. All documents 
pertaining to this matter are to be filed under case Number 
784448131. 
2. The Court shall not offset the Defendant's support 
obligation with the Social Security death benefits the minor child 
David receives as a result of his mother's' death. 
3. Based upon the Defendant's gross monthly income of 
$7,008.52, and allowing a credit for the Defendant's obligations to 
children in his present home, the Court shall modify the 
Defendant's child support obligation for David Charles Bowcutt to 
$596.00 per month, retroactive to February 5, 1993, the date of 
Janet Bowctt Wings's death. 
4. Defendant shall be entitled to a credit against child 
support arrearages resulting from the retroactive modification for 
the $250.00 that was paid directly to Mrs. Jensen in November, 
1993, and credit for any amounts deposited into Mr. Moody's trust 
account subsequent to the Court's November 24, 1993 Ruling. 
5. The funds held in Mr. Moody's trust account shall be turned 
over to Mrs. Jensen. 
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6. A Judgment shall be entered for the amount of $8,940.00 
($596 per month from February, 1993 through April, 1994) minus 
credit for $250.00 and a credit for the amount held in Mr. Moody's 
trust account. 
7. Future child support payments shall be made directly to 
Mrs. Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator for David Charles 
Bowcutt. 
8. Mrs. Jensen shall disperse these funds to herself and other 
third parties, such as the Prentice family, with whom David has 
been residing periodically and who are engaged in providing David 
with care and support. 
9. Mrs. Jensen shall submit to the Court on a quarterly basis, 
a detailed accounting of how the child support award is being 
expended on David's behalf. The first report due in August, 1994 
for the period of May through July, 1994. 
10. The child support funds shall not be turned over directly 
to David for his use at his discretion. If the funds are not used 
for ongoing support needs, they may be turned over to David upon 
his majority. 
11. Defendant shall be responsible for all costs associated 
with any therapy needs for David Bowcutt. 
12. Helen Jensen is awarded a judgment against the Defendant 
in the amount of $1,000.00 in attorney's fees and $105 in costs. 
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'. »• 
13. Judgment may be entered against Defendant for $1,105.00, 
for attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED AND EFFECTIVE this a day of AA^H ., 1994 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
SkM 
Robert Mood 
MU4r 
4-504 NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY 
TO: Robert Moody; 
You will please take notice that he undersigned attorney for 
Petitioner will submit the above and foregoing Order to the Court, 
for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of 
this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written 
objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of 
the Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah. 
DATED this 1994. 
*OSEMOND G.CBLAKELOCK 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
E X H I B I T TL. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Don Leslie Bowcut 
1130 West State Road 
Pleasant Grove, UT 
Telephone: (801) 785-7804 
'. •!»•! ?1 p'j i.r., 
K 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET BOWCUT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON LESLIE BOWCUT, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO APPEAL 
ORDER ON RULING: 
CHILD SUPPORT. 
Case No. 784448131 
Judge Hansen 
.i* 
M 
COMES NOW the Defendant and hereby moves to appeal the 
above-entitled matter on the grounds and reasons set forth in the 
accompanying Affidavit. 
DATED this /O day of June, 1994. 
DON LESLIE^)e0WCUT 
Acting in Pro Se 
t ^ 5 ^ 
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Don Leslie Bowcut 
1130 West State Road 
Pleasant Grove, UT 
Telephone: (801) 785-7804 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET BOWCUT, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO APPEAL 
Plaintiff/ : ORDER ON RULING: 
CHILD SUPPORT. <\ 
<< 
DON LESLIE BOWCUT, : Case No. 784448131 
Judge Hansen 
Defendant. : 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff died on the 5th day of February 1993. 
2. Any and all claims that the Plaintiff had against the 
Defendant were extinguished by the death of the Plaintiff. 
3. Upon the death of the Plaintiff
 # the Defendant became the 
minor child David C. Bowcut's only surviving parent and gained 
sole custody. 
"K 
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POINT ONE 
In the ruling of CASE NUMBER 784448131, dated November 1993, 
Judge Hansen mentioned Civil Case Number 934402209 in which the 
defendant alleges that Helen Jensen was fraudulently appointed 
Guardian and conservator of minor child David C. Bowcut. Judge 
Hansen never made a ruling as to whether or not the motion to 
reverse Guardian and conservatorship would be granted. 
On September 3, 1993, Helen Jensen was granted Guardian and 
Conservator of David C. Bowcut. Previous to that date, she had 
no grounds to receive any child support. The ruling made by 
Judge Hansen of making the child support retroactive from the 
date of the mother's death was in error, as Mrs. Jensen had 
neither physical nor legal custody of the child for the majority 
of that time. 
On April 5, 1994, Helen Jensen stated that the minor child 
David C. Bowcut was not attending school, he is using alcohol and 
possibly drugs. She also stated that she npr any family member 
had any control over the minor child. The Defendant alleges that 
this situation is not a good environment for the minor child and 
in the best interest of the child, he should be placed with his 
father. Further, any claims toward child support made by Helen 
Jensen should be denied because she was not supplying guidance 
and supervision for the child as verbally contracted. 
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POINT TWO 
Relevant factors were not considered when calculating the 
income of the defendant. The court found that the defendant is a 
physician who earns $62,257.26 from his medical practice and 
earns and additional $21,845 from a contract with the Utah County 
for provision of medical services to the Utah County Jail for a 
total earning of $84,102.26. This calculation did not take into 
consideration that in order to command such a salary, tremendous 
educational loans were necessary. Dr. Bowcut has outstanding 
school loan obligation of $1200.00 per month which reduces his 
spendable income by that same amount. In setting up a medical 
practice, Dr. Bowcut also pays small business taxes which results 
in a large reduction of his spendable income. Therefore, the 
contract with Utah County should not be considered for 
calculation in the child support 
POINT THREE 
In the "Child Support Obligation Worksheet (Sole Custody And 
Paternity)11, no amount of obligation for the mother was 
calculated. The minor child is receiving $233.00 entitlement 
for Social Security due to his mother's death. Judge Hansen made 
it clear that he did not want those monies simply given to David 
to spend as he wishes and that it should go toward his support. 
This amount should be included as support for the minor child. 
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POINT FOUR 
The attorney, Mr. Robert Moody did not address the 
issues that the Defendant Dr. Bowcut desired. Mr. Moody defended 
on the grounds of lowering the child support to the necessary 
amount. Dr. Bowcut wanted the custody returned to him so that he 
could supervise the minor child. 
POINT FIVE 
The Defendant objects to the order to pay the plaintiffs 
attorney fees. The Defendant alleges that the court case should 
have never taken place. The Defendant told the Plaintiff 
repeatedly that when the minor child David C Bowcut stayed at 
one house 30 days, he would send money to that individual. Had 
she maintained some level of control over the child—kept him in 
school and coming home at night—as agreed prior to guardianship 
transfer, she would have been fully compensated. Upon sending 
the first payment, Helen Jensen filed the court case. 
DATED this /A day of June, 1994. 
DON LES: 
Acting in Pro Se 
BOWCUT 
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C E R T I F I C A T E O F M A I L I N G 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the forgoing Motion to Correct Order on Ruling: Child Support, 
this /?o day of June, 1994, postage prepaid to the following: 
Roseinund G. Blakelock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84601 
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ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK #6183 
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
JANET BOWCUTT, * 
Plaintiff, * 
* MOTION FOR 
VS. * STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS 
* AND NOTION FOR JOINT (ONE) 
* DECISION BY JUDGES BURNINGHAM 
* AND HANSEN 
* 
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT, * Case No. 93340310 
* (consolidated into #784448131) 
Defendant * Judge Guy Burningham 
* and Judge Steven Hansen 
COMES NOW Helen Jensen, by and through her counsel, Rosemond 
Blakelock and pursuant to Rule 62, of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, moves the court, Judges Hansen and Burningham, for an 
Order Staying All Further Proceedings, in the Fourth District 
Court, on the grounds and for the reasons that there is an appeal 
before the Utah Court Of Appeals, Case Number 940361-CA, which 
deals with the «sa™=> IRSHPS and requests the same relief as is now 
before the court by way of a "MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT: 
ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR" (Judge Burningham) and 
a "MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGEMENT: NOVEMBER 24, 1993 RULING", 
(Judge Hansen). 
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Further, this Motion requests that Judge Hansen and Judge 
Burningham issue one order which stays the proceedings because the 
case has been consolidated into case number #784448131. In 
addition, because the two motions filed with the Fourth District 
Court are also before the court of Appeals as one appeal, it would 
serve the interests of justice for all parties, all judges, and all 
court systems to be aware of the numerous pleadings and relief 
being presented to the court. 
All of these matters are more fully set forth in the 
accompanying Memorandum. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 5th day of August, 1994. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correctr copy of the 
foregoing Motion and accompanying Memorandum in Support to Don 
Leslie Bowcutt, 1130 West State Road, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and Ron 
Wilkinson, 1139 South Orem Blvd., Orem, Utah 84057, on this 5th 
day of August, 1994. 
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ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK #6183 
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
* 
JANET BOWCUTT, * 
Plaintiff, * 
* 
vs. * 
* 
* 
* 
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT, * 
Defendant * 
* 
COMES NOW Helen Jensen, by and through her counsel, Rosemond 
Blakelock and as for Memorandum in Support of Motion For Stay of 
Proceedings submits the following: 
(please note this Memorandum is meant to address both of 
Defendant's Motions, because there now one case, #784448131. 
However, two separate Motions have been submitted as well as two 
copies of this Memorandum, one for Judge Hansen and one for Judge 
Burningham)• 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR 
STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS 
AND MOTION FOR JOINT (ONE) 
DECISION BY JUDGES BURNINGHAM 
AND HANSEN 
Case No. 93340310 
(consolidated into #784448131) 
Judge Guy Burningham 
and Judge Steven Hansen 
1 
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FACTS 
1. On September 3, 1993, Judge Guy Burningham signed an 
Order Appointing Guardian And Conservator, appointing Helen 
Jensen the Guardian of minor child David Bowcutt. 
2. On or about October 27, 1993, an Order to Show Cause was 
filed in Fourth District Court by Helen Jensen, Guardian and 
Conservator of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, regarding 
the issue of child support. 
3. On November 4, 1993 an Order To Show Cause hearing was 
held before Judge Steven Hansen, regarding the issue of child 
support. Robert Moody, appeared for the Appellant, Don Leslie 
Bowcutt. 
4. On or about October 27, 1993, the Appellant, through 
counsel, filed a Motion To Dismiss the Order To Show Cause, along 
with a Memorandum in Support thereof. 
5. Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator, filed a Response 
to Motion To Dismiss Order To Show Cause on November 4, 1993. 
6. On November 4, 1994, at a Hearing on the Order To Show 
Cause, the Court took argument from counsel, regarding 
jurisdiction, child support arrearages and Appellant's on-going 
child support obligation and took the matter under advisement. 
7. On November 24, 1994, the honorable Judge Steven L. 
Hansen, issued a Ruling regarding the issues of on-going child 
2 
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support, and jurisdiction. 
8. On November 24, 1993, the Court found that the Appellant 
had an on-going support obligation to the minor child. 
9. On November 24, 1993/ the Court found that minor child, 
David Charles Bowcutt, did have standing to maintain an action 
against his natural father for support, via a Guardian Ad Litem, 
and Ron Wilkinson, was appointed as Guardian Ad Litem. 
10. On November 24, 1993, with regard to jurisdiction, the 
court found that the court has continuing jurisdiction to make an 
award of child support, pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(3). 
11. The court ordered a special review hearing to "determine 
the status and needs of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, 
as well as Defendant#s [Appellant's] current income level." 
12. On December 23, 1993, the hearing was held before Judge 
Hansen, regarding the status of the case and the Appellant's 
financial status for purposes of establishing the amount of child 
support. Appearing at the hearing held December 23, 1993, the 
Appellant's counsel made a request for an Evidentiary Hearing, 
regarding only the amount of the child support, not whether there 
should be child support. 
13. No appeal was filed regarding the court's decision to 
conduct an Evidentiary Hearing to establish the amount of child 
support obligation of the Appellant. 
14. On March 21, 1994, an Evidentiary Hearing was held, 
regarding the sole issue of the amount of Appellants child 
3 
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support obligation for the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt. 
15. The minor child was not present in court, but was 
represented by his Guardian Ad Litem, Ron Wilkinson. 
16. The minor child's maternal grandmother, and Guardian and 
Conservator, Helen Jensen, was also present, with her counsel, 
Rosemond Blakelock. 
17. The Trial Court, at the Evidentiary Hearing, heard 
argument and testimony regarding the Appellant's ability to 
provide support for the minor child, David Bowcutt, and the said 
minor child's need for on-going support. 
18. The Trial Court then took the matter of the amount of 
child support under advisement, and on or about April 5, 1994, 
made a Ruling, issuing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
concerning the amount of child support to be assessed. 
19. Appellant, either personally or through counsel, made a 
general appearance at all hearings, provided testimony to the 
court regarding his opinion as to the monthly expenses and needs 
of his minor child, David Bowcutt, and in all other matters 
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court, without 
objection. 
20. On the 13th day of May, 1994, Judge Hansen issued the 
Ruling establishing the amount of the child support, from which 
Ruling the Appellant appeals. 
21. The Defendant then filed A Notice of Appeal, on or about 
the 10th of June, 1994, which requested the matter be decided by 
4 
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the Utah Court of Appeals. 
22. The case is presently pending in the Utah Court of 
Appeals, as CASE NO. 940351-CA. See attachment A, Docketing 
Statement. 
23. Defendant then (In the Court of Appeals) requested 
Summary Disposition on his appeal with the Appeals court, which 
was denied, and the case is proceeding in the court of Appeals. 
27. Defendant now has a date certain in which he is to 
submit his "Brief11 to the Utah Court of Appeals, regarding his 
request for relief from the November 24, 1993 Ruling. 
28. Defendant has now filed two separate Rule 60 (b) 
actions, requesting the same relief which is now at issue before 
the Appeals Court. 
29. Defendant's Rule 60 (b) motion requesting relief from 
judgment from the Order Appointing Guardian And Conservator is 
"ISSUE THREE", and "ISSUE ONE" in Defendant's Docketing 
Statement, in case number 940361-CA, before the Court of Appeals. 
30. Defendant's Rule 60 (b) motion requesting relief from 
judgment from the November 24, 1993 Ruling request the same 
relief and present the same issues as "ISSUE TWO" in Defendant's 
Docketing Statement, in case number 940361-CA, before the Court 
of Appeals. 
5 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT MAY GRANT A 
STAY UNTIL THE MATTER IS HEARD ON IT'S 
MERITS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Defendant has a case pending at this time in the Utah 
Court of Appeals dealing with the same issues, and requesting the 
same relief, which he now brings before the Fourth District 
Court, with Rule 60 (b) Motions. 
In the Defendant's Docketing Statement, (attached) page 3, 
#7, "ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW" the defendant 
appeals the appointment of Helen Jensen as Guardian and 
Conservator. 
In the Defendant's Docketing Statement, page 3# #7, "ISSUE 
FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW" the defendant appeals 
jurisdiction, which is Issue Two in the Defendant's Docketing 
Statement. 
In Lewis v. Moultreer 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981), the Court 
held that in such circumstances, a stay is the appropriate 
remedy: 
It lies within the inherent powers of the courts to 
grant a stay of proceedings. It is a discretionary 
power, and the grounds therefor necessarily vary 
according to the requirements of each individual case* 
A common ground for a stay is the pendency of another 
action involving identical parties and issues and where 
6 
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a decision in one action settles the issues in another, 
or when the decision in an action is essential to the 
decision in another.2. 1 Am.Jur.2d, Actions, § 92, et 
seq.; see also, Power Train, Inc. v. Stuver, Utah, 550 
P.2d 1293 (1976). 
In the instant case, the case (940361-CA) in the Court of 
Appeals involves the identical parties and issues and further, 
and even more critical, the decision by the Court of Appeals will 
"settle" the issues which the Defendant brings to the court at 
this time. 
It was the Defendant who chose to file an appeal with the 
Utah Court of Appeals and he cannot now go "forum shopping" in an 
attempt to reach a desired resolution in the Fourth District 
Court. 
The Defendant now has two courts (Appeals and Fourth 
District) addressing the same issues. In addition, there are two 
different judges from the Fourth District Court, that is Judge 
Hansen and Judge Burningham, who have been asked to rule on an 
issue now before the Court of Appeals. Should the matter be 
permitted to go forward, it would be a procedural impossibility 
to sort out the mess when three different decisions (Utah Court 
of Appeals, Judge Hansen's and Judge Burningham's) decisions were 
issued, all regarding the same issues and same request for 
relief. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the Defendant has an appeal pending with the Utah 
Court of Appeals which deals with the same individuals, the same 
issues and the same request for relief, the Fourth District 
Court, (Judges Hansen and Burningham) should issue a stay of the 
proceedings until the Court of Appeals decides the case on it's 
merits. 
DATED this ^ 
-~? 
) t ^ ^ 
day of 
,•7 
Rosamond G. Blakeloc 
Counsel for the Hele 
h/-u J r/ V^ 1994, 
^ - £ ^ * 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correctr copy of 
the foregoing Motion and accompanying Memorandum in Support to 
Don Leslie Bowcutt, 1130 West State Road, Pleasant Grove, Utah, 
and Ron Wilkinson, 1139 South Orem Blvd., Orem, Utah 84057, on 
this 5th day of August, 1994 
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Don Leslie Bowcut 
1130 West State Road 
Pleasant Grove, UT 
Telephone: (801) 785-7804 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET BOWCUT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON LESLIE BOWCUT, 
Defendant. 
ANSWER TO MOTION FOR 
STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS 
AND MOTION FOR JOINT (ONE) 
DECISION BY JUDGES BURNINGHAM 
AND HANSEN 
AND REQUEST FOR FINAL RULING 
Case No. 93340310 
(consolidated into #784448131) 
Judge Guy Burningham 
and Judge Steven Hansen 
COMES NOW the Defendant in response to the Plaintiff's Motion For 
Stay of All Proceedings and Motion For Joint Decision by Judges 
Burningham and Hansen. He further formally requests a ruling on 
both Motion For Relief From Judgement: Order Appointing Guardian 
and Conservator and Motion For Relief From Judgment: November 24r 
1993 Ruling filed by the defendant on July 26, 1994. 
MOTION FOR STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS 
The Defendant begs the court to consider and rule on both of 
his previously filed Motions For Relief of Judgment. Contrary to 
Plaintiff's counsel's accusations of "forum shopping", the 
Defendant has filed for relief under rule 60(b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure in an effort to bring the matter before a court 
that the Plaintiff and her counsel will accept as having 
1 
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jurisdiction over this matter. The Defendant would have been 
happy to leave the matter at the Appellate Court level but the 
Plaintiff in her Memorandum In Response To Request For Summary 
Disposition And Memorandum In Support Of Appellee's Motion To 
Affirm And Motion For Sanctions page 8 (on file with this court) 
states that the Court of Appeals was not the proper forum to 
raise these two earlier issues because the 30-day rule had 
elapsed. "While the Appellant might appeal the subsequent 
ruling, as to the amount of support, the issues of jurisdiction 
is Res Judicata." The defendant then petitioned the Court Of 
Appeals for an Extraordinary Writ on both matters but was sent 
back to the trial court to seek relief under rule 60(b). The 
Plaintiff would have the Courts believe that no forum is proper. 
It is interesting to note that at neither the trial court 
level nor the appellate court level has the Plaintiff and her 
counsel ever disputed the defendant's claim that Mrs. Jensen was 
illegally placed as guardian and jurisdiction improper. Instead, 
Plaintiff has always chosen to argue that the forum is improper. 
Defendant maintains that Utah law not only allows for relief in 
cases of violation of constitutional rights or improper 
jurisdiction, but insists that it will be given at some level of 
the judicial system. 
Regarding the Trial Court's jurisdiction to relieve a party 
of a judgment even though it may be a final judgment in appeal 
the defendant cites White v State 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990): 
the trial court has jurisdiction to consider a rule 
60(b) motion after an appeal has been filed and also 
2 
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has power to deny it. But if the motion has merit, the 
trial court must so advise the appellate court, and 
the moving party may then request a remand. 
and Baker v Western Sur. Co. 757 P.2d 878 (Utah 1988): 
We, therefore adopt the position adopted by a majority 
courts in recent years that the trial court has 
jurisdiction to consider a 60(b) motion while an appeal 
is pending. That approach allows the trial court, 
which is in a better position to recognize a frivolous 
60(b) motion, to evaluate the merits of the motion more 
quickly, and may avoid unnecessary appeals.—We 
further hold if the district court finds the motion to 
be without merit, it may enter an order denying the 
motion, and the parties may appeal from that order. 
If, however, the trial court is inclined to grant the 
motion, counsel should obtain a brief memorandum to 
that affect from the trial court, and request an order 
of remand from the appellate court so that the trial 
court can enter an order. Further, we are optimistic 
that district courts, especially when the pendency of 
an appeal is brought to their attention, can be 
expected to act promptly on most 60(b) motions. 
The Plaintiff holds that the defendant has two courts 
dealing with identical issues yet claims to the appeals court 
that it has no jurisdiction to act on the two orders from which 
relief is being sought and that only the amount of support can be 
appealed at this date. Thus she holds that that avenue of relief 
has been closed. According to this logic the only avenue of 
relief left open lies with rule 60(b). 
While it is true that relief from either judgment will 
likely render the subsequent May 13, 1994 Order void, common 
sense would indicate that relief, if possible, at the trial court 
level should precede a possibly lengthy and costly appeal. If 
relief is granted from either motion, the defendant will then 
request an Order Of Remand from the appellate court. 
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MOTION FOR JOINT DECISION BY JUDGES 
The Defendant objects to the Plaintiff's motion for joint 
decisions from Judges Burningham and Hansen on the grounds that 
while these cases were eventually consolidated they were separate 
at the time of each individual ruling. Plaintiff's counsel has 
tried to muddy the water with claims that independent relief 
would cause a "procedural impossibility" when in actuality relief 
from either judgment would simply then be taken to the Appeals 
Court in request for an Order of Remand and most likely render 
the appeal moot. While a lengthy appeal and costly attorney fees 
may be considered appealing to Plaintiff's counsel, Defendant 
holds that the most expeditious route would best serve the 
Plaintiff, Defendant# and minor child. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant holds that the Plaintiff's counsel's 
description of his actions subsequent to the orders from which 
relief is being sought inaccurately portrays the purpose of the 
evidentiary hearing and the Defendant's acceptance of 
jurisdiction. But to argue these issues which transpired after 
the orders from which relief is sought seems contrary to the 
intent of the law under Rule 60(b). The Defendant maintains that 
even if he had accepted jurisdiction subsequently (which he 
hadn't), the order would still be void under Utah law and even 
if# as Plaintiff's counsel claims, the matter of guardianship was 
never contested until appeal (which it was on several occasions), 
4 
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the appointment still breached his constitutionally protected 
rights. 
The Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court have 
already decided on these very issues in very similar cases such 
as Nielson v Nielson 826 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1991), In re O'Hare's 
Guardianship 341 P.2d 205 (Utah 1959), and In re J.P. 341 P.2d 
205 (Utah 1982). 
Also the Utah Court of Appeals has reviewed the issues 
raised in these motions and has sent the defendant back to the 
Trial court under Rule 60(b). To then stay a decision until the 
court of Appeals goes through full plenary presentation and 
ruling would be contrary to the higher courts intention. By 
ruling on the separate motions for relief at this time, the trial 
court would allow the defendant to enter appeals from both orders 
and have all issues resolved a the appellate level. Otherwise 
the Appeals Court may have to look at these issues twice. 
The Utah Supreme court has clearly stated that the Trial 
Court has no choice in this matter State of Utah Department of 
Social Services v Vigil 784 P.2d 1130: 
However when a motion to vacate a judgment is 
based on an claim of lack of jurisdiction, 
the district court has no discretion: if 
jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot 
stand without denying due process to the one 
against whom it runs. 
The Defendant can show that his constitutional right to due 
process was violated by the appointment of guardianship without 
the termination of his parental rights, and that the November 24, 
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1993 Ruling is void because of lack of jurisdiction over the 
parties. He is therefore entitled to relief from judgment and 
such an order should render forth. 
The Defendant hereby requests that the court separately rule 
on MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT: ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN AND 
CONSERVATOR and MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT: NOVEMBER 24, 
1993 RULING. 
DATED this (0^ day of August, 1994, 
DON LESLIE BOWCUT 
ActingViia Pro Se 
C E R T X F X C A T E O F M A X 31.11ST C 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the forgoing ANSWER TO MOTION FOR STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS AND 
MOTION FOR JOINT (ONE) DECISION BY JUDGES BURNINGHAM AND HANSEN 
AND REQUEST FOR FINAL RULING, this 10^ day of August, 1994, 
postage prepaid to the following: 
Rosemund G. Blakelock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84601 
Ron Wilkinson 
1139 South Orem Blvd. 
Orem, UT 840' 
O^M^l 
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*-3c-4 JUDICIAL CODE 
B-3c-4. Disclosure of confidential communications. 
The confidential communication between a victim and a sexual assault 
mnselor is available to a third person only when: 
(1) the victim is a minor and the counselor believes it is in the best 
interest of the victim to disclose the confidential communication to the 
victim's parents; 
(2) the victim is a minor and the minor's parents or guardian have 
consented to disclosure of the confidential communication to a third party 
based upon representations made by the counselor that it is in the best 
interest of the minor victim to make such disclosure; 
(3) the victim is not a minor, has given consent, and the counselor 
believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish the desired result of 
counseling; or 
(4) the counselor has an obligation under Title 62A, Chapter 4, to re-
port information transmitted in the confidential communication. 
History: C. 1953, 7^c -4 , enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 158, § 1; L. 1984, ch. 17, § 1; 1992, 
C h
^endme4nt Notes. - The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, substituted the 
reference to Title 62A, Chapter 4, for "Chapter 
3b, Title 78" in Subsection (4). 
CHAPTER 3f 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Section 
78-3M01. 
7$-3f-102. 
78-3M03. 
78-3M04. 
78-3f-105. 
78-3f-106. 
78-3M07. 
78-3f-108. 
Short title. 
Judicial process for termination 
— Parent unfit or incompe-
tent — Best interest of child. 
Definitions. 
Petition — Who may file. 
Contents of petition. 
Notice — Nature of proceed-
ings. 
Grounds for termination of pa-
rental rights. 
Evidence of grounds for termi-
nation. 
Section 
78-3f-109. 
78-3M10. 
78-3f-lll. 
78-3M12. 
78-3f-113. 
78-3f-114. 
Specific considerations where 
child is not in physical cus-
tody of parent. 
Specific considerations where a 
child has been placed in fos-
ter home. 
Court disposition of child upon 
termination. 
Review following termination. 
Effect of decree. 
Voluntary relinquishment — 
Irrevocable. 
78-3f-101. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known as the "Termination of Parental Rights Act. 
History: C. 1953, M M , enacted by I . Effective D a . , ^ J - J J - * f S t . 
1992, ch. 221, § 4. 
TERMINATION ( 
78-3M02, Judicial proces 
or incompetent -
(1) This chapter provides a judi( 
severance of the parent-child rela^ 
and interests of all parties concen 
the state. 
(2) Wherever possible family life 
if a parent is found, by reason o 
incompetent based upon any of th 
part, the court shall then consider 
paramount importance in determii 
shall be ordered. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M02, enacted b 
1992, ch. 221, § 5. 
78-3M03. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Division" means the 1 
partment of Human Service 
(2) "Failure of parental a 
are unable or unwilling with 
the circumstances, conduct, 
child outside of their home, 
efforts made by the Division 
home. 
(3) "Plan" means a writte 
who has been removed fro 
Division of Family Services 
upon the parents directly 
objective of reuniting the i 
comply with the terms and 
for adoption. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M03, enacte< 
1992, ch. 221, § 6. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, c 
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 
78-3M04. Petition — ^ 
(1) The following persons or 
the parent-child relationship 
division: 
(a) the division; 
(b) the child's guardiai 
(c) a parent, blood reh 
(d) the child's foster ps 
pursue adoption and has 1 
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lential communication to a third party 
>y the counselor that it is in the best 
ake such disclosure; 
ias given consent, and the counselor 
V to accomplish the desired result of 
an under Title 62A, Chapter 4, to re-
ie confidential communication. 
ment, effective April 27, 1992, substituted the 
reference to Title 62A, Chapter 4, for "Chapter 
3b, Title 78" in Subsection (4). 
ER 3f 
ARENTAL RIGHTS 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 78-3f-l< 
Section* 
r8-3f-109. 
8-3f-110. 
8-3f-lll. 
8-3f-112. 
8-3f-113. 
B-3f-114. 
Specific considerations where 
child is not in physical cus-
tody of parent. 
Specific considerations where a 
child has been placed in fos-
ter home. 
Court disposition of child upon 
termination. 
Review following termination. 
Effect of decree. 
Voluntary relinquishment — 
Irrevocable. 
srmination of Parental Rights Act." 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
78-3M02. Judicial process for termination — Parent unf 
or incompetent — Best interest of child. 
(1) This chapter provides a judicial process for voluntary and involuntai 
severance of the parent-child relationship, designed to safeguard the rlgh 
and interests of all parties concerned and promote their welfare and that 
the state. 
(2) Wherever possible family life should be strengthened and preserved, bi 
if a parent is found, by reason of his conduct or condition, to be unfit < 
incompetent based upon any of the grounds for termination described in th 
part, the court shall then consider the welfare and best interest of the child 
paramount importance in determining whether termination of parental righ 
shall be ordered. 
History. C. 1953, 78-3M02, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 221, § 5. 
78-3f-103. Definitions. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 22 
19 makes the act effective on July 1, 199 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Division" means the Division of Family Services within the D 
partment of Human Services. 
(2) "Failure of parental adjustment" means that a parent or paren 
are unable or unwilling within a reasonable time to substantially cone 
the circumstances, conduct, or conditions that led to placement of the 
child outside of their home, notwithstanding reasonable and approprial 
efforts made by the Division of Family Services to return the child to thi 
home. 
(3) "Plan" means a written agreement between the parents of a chil 
who has been removed from his home by the juvenile court, and! tl 
Division of Family Services or written conditions and obligations impos< 
upon the parents directly by the juvenile court, that have a prima] 
objective of reuniting the family or, if the parents neglect or refuse 
comply with the terms and conditions of the case plan, freeing the chi 
for adoption. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M03, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 221, § 6. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
Cross-References. -
Services, § 62A-4-104. 
Division of Fami 
78-3M04. Petition — Who may file. 
(1) The following persons or entities may file a petition for termination 
the parent-child relationship with regard to a child in the custody of tl 
division: 
(a) the division; 
(b) the child's guardian ad litem; 
(c) a parent, blood relative, or adoptive relative of the child; or 
(d) the child's foster parent, so long as that foster parent intends 
pursue adoption and has had physical custody of the child for one year 
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78-3f-105 JUDICIAL CODE 
longer. A foster parent does not lose standing to file a petition under this 
section solely because the division removes the child from that home. 
(2) The division may request either the attorney general or an appropriate 
county attorney or district attorney to file a petition for termination of paren-
tal rights under this part. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M04, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 221, § 7; 1993, ch. 38, § 113. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or dis-
trict attorney" near the middle of Subsection 
(2). 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
78-3M05. Contents of petition. 
(1) The petition for termination of parental rights shall include, to the best 
information or belief of the petitioner: 
(a) the name and place of residence of the petitioner; 
(b) the name, sex, date and place of birth, and residence of the child; 
(c) the relationship of the petitioner to the child; 
(d) the names, addresses, and dates of birth of the parents, if known; 
(e) the name and address of the person having legal custody or guard-
ianship, or acting in loco parentis to the child, or the organization or 
agency having legal custody or providing care for the child; 
(f) the grounds on which termination of parental rights is sought, in 
accordance with Section 78-3f»107; and 
(g) the names and addresses of the persons or the authorized agency to 
whom legal custody or guardianship of the child might be transferred. 
(2) A copy of any relinquishment or consent, if any, previously executed by 
the parent or parents shall be attached to the petition. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M05, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 221, § 8. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
78-3f-106. Notice — Nature of proceedings. 
(1) After a petition for termination of parental rights has been filed, notice 
of that fact and of the time and place of the hearing shall be provided, in 
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to the parents, the guard-
ian, the person or agency having legal custody of the child, and to any person 
acting in loco parentis to the child. 
(2) A hearing shall be held specifically on the question of termination of 
parental rights no sooner than ten days after service of summons is complete. 
A verbatim record of the proceedings shall be taken and the parties shall be 
advised of their right to counsel. The summons shall contain a statement to 
the effect that the rights of the parent or parents are proposed to be perma-
nently terminated in the proceedings. That statement may be contained in the 
summons originally issued in the proceeding or in a separate summons subse-
quently issued. 
(3) The proceedings are civil in nature and are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The court shall in all cases require the petitioner to estab-
lish the facts by clear and convincing evidence, and shall give full and careful 
consideration to all of the evidence presented with regard to the constitutional 
rights and claims of the parent and, if a parent is found, by reason of his 
TERMINATION 
conduct or condition, to be unfit or 
for termination described in this } 
fare and best interest of the chil< 
whether termination of parental 
(4) Any hearing held pursuant 
without admittance of any person 
ceeding, unless the court determi 
will not be detrimental to the c. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M06, enacted I 
1992, ch. 221, § 9. 
78-3M07. Grounds for t 
The court may terminate all p 
parents if it finds any one of tt 
(1) that the parent or pai 
(2) that the parent or pai 
(3) that the parent or pai 
(4) that the child is being < 
the supervision of the court 
responsible agency has made 
vices and that either of the 
(a) the child has been 
tive total period of one y< 
parent has substantially 
circumstances that caus< 
or 
(b) the child has beer 
tive total period of two 
the parent has been una 
that cause the child to 
substantial likelihood tl 
ing proper and effectiv 
(5) failure of parental ac 
(6) that only token effort 
(a) to support or cor 
(b) to prevent negle< 
(c) to eliminate the i 
abuse of the child; or 
(d) to avoid being a 
(7) the parent or parents 
rights to the child, and the 
best interest; or 
(8) the parent or parents 
was returned to live in his 
repeatedly refused or faile 
protection. 
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n removes the child from that home, 
the attorney general or an appropriate 
Sle a petition for termination of paren-
trict attorney" near the middle of Subsection 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
>n. 
rental rights shall include, to the best 
ence of the petitioner; 
J of birth, and residence of the child; 
oner to the child; 
tes of birth of the parents, if known; 
>erson having legal custody or guard-
to the child, or the organization or 
oviding care for the child; 
ttion of parental rights is sought, in 
and 
* persons or the authorized agency to 
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I to the petition. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
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TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 78-3f-l( 
conduct or condition, to be unfit or incompetent based upon any of the grounc 
for termination described in this part, the court shall then consider the we 
fare and best interest of the child of paramount importance in determinin 
whether termination of parental rights shall be ordered. 
(4) Any hearing held pursuant to this part shall be held in closed com 
without admittance of any person who is not necessary to the action or pn 
ceeding, unless the court determines that holding the hearing in open com 
will not be detrimental to the child. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M06, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 221, § 9. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 22! 
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992 
78-3f-107. Grounds for termination of parental rights. 
The court may terminate all parental rights with respect to one or lx»tl 
parents if it finds any one of the following: 
(1) that the parent or parents have abandoned the child; 
(2) that the parent or parents have neglected or abused the child; 
(3) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent; 
(4) that the child is being cared for in an out-of-home placement undei 
the supervision of the court or the division, that the division or othei 
responsible agency has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate ser 
vices and that either of the following circumstances exists: 
(a) the child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumula 
tive total period of one year or longer pursuant to court order and thi 
parent has substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the 
circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement 
or 
(b) the child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumula 
tive total period of two years or longer pursuant to court order anc 
the parent has been unable or unwilling to remedy the circumstances 
that cause the child to be in out-of-home placement, and there iis £ 
substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercis 
ing proper and effective parental care in the near future; 
(5) failure of parental adjustment, as defined in this chapter; 
(6) that only token efforts have been made by the parent or parents 
(a) to support or communicate with the child; 
(b) to prevent neglect of the child; 
(c) to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental, or emotional 
abuse of the child; or 
(d) to avoid being an unfit parent; 
(7) the parent or parents have voluntarily relinquished their parental 
rights to the child, and the court finds that termination is in the child's 
best interest; or 
(8) the parent or parents, after a period of trial during which the child 
was returned to live in his own home, substantially and continuously ox 
repeatedly refused or failed to give the child proper parental care and 
protection. 
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78-3f-108 JUDICIAL CODE 
History: C. 1953, 78-3f-107, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 221, § 10. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
78-3f-108. Evidence of grounds for termination. 
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have abandoned a child, it 
is prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or parents: 
(a) although having legal custody of the child, have surrendered physi-
cal custody of the child, and for a period of six months following the 
surrender have not manifested to the child or to the person having the 
physical custody of the child a firm intention to resume physical custody 
or to make arrangements for the care of the child; or 
(b) have failed to communicate with the child by mail, telephone, or 
otherwise for six months or failed to have shown the normal interest of a 
natural parent, without just cause. 
(2) In determining whether a parent or parents are unfit or have neglected 
a child the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following conditions: 
(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency of the parent 
that renders him unable to care for the immediate and continuing physi-
cal or emotional needs of the child for extended periods of time; 
(b) conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally, or sexually 
cruel or abusive nature; 
(c) habitual or excessive use of intoxicating liquors, controlled sub-
stances, or dangerous drugs that render the parent unable to care for the 
child; 
(d) repeated or continuous failure to provide the child with adequate 
food, clothing, shelter, education, or other care necessary for his physical, 
mental, and emotional health and development by a parent or parents 
who are capable of providing that care. However, a parent who, legiti-
mately practicing his religious beliefs, does not provide specified medical 
treatment for a child is not for that reason alone a negligent or unfit 
parent; 
(e) conviction of a felony, if the facts of the crime are of such a nature 
as to indicate the unfitness of the parent to provide adequate care to the 
extent necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health and 
development; 
(f) if the parent is incarcerated as a result of conviction of a felony, and 
the sentence is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal 
home for more than one year; 
(g) injury or death of a sibling of the child due to known or substanti-
ated abuse or neglect by the parent or parents; 
(h) a history of violent behavior; or 
(i) a single incident of life-threatening or gravely disabling injury to or 
disfigurement of the child. 
(3) If a child has been placed in the custody of the division and the parent or 
parents fail to comply substantially with the terms and conditions of a plan to 
reunite the family within six months after the date on which the child was 
placed or the plan was commenced, whichever occurs later, that failure to 
comply is evidence of failure of parental adjustment. 
TERMINATION 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M08, enacted b> 
1992, ch. 221, § 11. 
78-3M09- Specific consid 
physical custody 
(1) If a child is not in the phys 
court, in determining whether ps 
consider, but is not limited to, tl 
(a) the services provided or« 
a reunion with the child; 
(b) the physical, mental, or 
and his desires regarding the t 
sufficient capacity to express 
(c) the effort the parent or 
stances, conduct, or condition 
return him to his home after 
not limited to: 
(i) payment of a reason 
maintenance, if financial 
(ii) maintenance of re* 
child that was designed a 
with the parent or parei 
(iii) maintenance of re; 
custodian of the child. 
(2) For purposes of this sectior 
duct, contributions, contacts, anc 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M09, enacted b 
1992, ch. 221, § 12. 
78-3M10. Specific consic 
placed in fostei 
If a child is in the custody of the 
a foster home and the division in 
ing the child, with an ultimate 
parents adopt him, the court sh; 
integrated into the foster family t< 
that family, and whether the fosti 
treat the child as a member of th< 
not limited to, the following: 
(1) the love, affection, anc 
child and the parents, and 
(2) the capacity and dispc 
child was removed as compa 
child love, affection, and gu 
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TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
/ 
78-3f-110 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M08, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 221, § 11. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
78-3M09. Specific considerations where child is not in 
physical custody of parent. 
(1) If a child is not in the physical custody of the parent or parents, the 
court, in determining whether parental rights should be terminated shall 
consider, but is not limited to, the following: 
(a) the services provided or offered to the parent or parents to facilitate 
a reunion with the child; 
(b) the physical, mental, or emotional condition and needs of the child 
and his desires regarding the termination, if the court determines he is of 
sufficient capacity to express his desires; and 
(c) the effort the parent or parents have made to adjust their circum-
stances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child's best interest to 
return him to his home after a reasonable length of time, including but 
not limited to: 
(i) payment of a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and 
maintenance, if financially able; 
(ii) maintenance of regular visitation or other contact with the 
child that was designed and carried out in a plan to reunite the child 
with the parent or parents; and 
(iii) maintenance of regular contact and communication with the 
custodian of the child. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court shall disregard incidental con-
duct, contributions, contacts, and communications. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M09, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 221, § 12. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
78-3f-110. Specific considerations where a child has been 
placed in foster home. 
If a child is in the custody of the division and has been placed and resides in 
a foster home and the division institutes proceedings under this part regard-
ing the child, with an ultimate goal of having the child's foster parent or 
parents adopt him, the court shall consider whether the child has become 
integrated into the foster family to the extent that his familial identity is with 
that family, and whether the foster family is able and willing permanently to 
treat the child as a member of the family. The court shall also consider, but is 
not limited to, the following: 
(1) the love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the 
child and the parents, and the child's ties with the foster family; 
(2) the capacity and disposition of the child's parents from whom the 
child was removed as compared with that of the foster family to give the 
child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education of the 
child; 
(3) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory foster 
home and the desirability of his continuing to live in that environment; 
(4) the permanence as a family unit of the foster family; and 
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X 
78-3M11 JUDICIAL CODE FOSTER CAI 
(5) any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particu-
lar placement of a child. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M10, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
1992, ch. 221, § 13. § 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
78-3M11. Court disposition of child upon termination. 
(1) Upon entry of an order terminating the rights of the parent or parents, 
the court may: 
(a) place the child in the legal custody and guardianship of a licensed 
child placement agency or the division for adoption; or 
(b) make any other disposition of the child authorized under Section 
78-3a-39. 
(2) All adoptable children shall be placed for adoption. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M11, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 221, § 14. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
78-3M12. Review following termination. 
(1) At the conclusion of the hearing in which the court orders termination 
of the parent-child relationship, the court shall order that a review hearing be 
held within 90 days following the date of termination if the child has not been 
permanently placed. 
(2) At that review hearing, the agency or individual vested with custody of 
the child shall report to the court regarding the plan for permanent placement 
of the child. The guardian ad litem shall submit to the court a written report 
with recommendations, based on an independent investigation, for disposition 
meeting the best interests of the child. 
(3) The court may order the agency or individual vested with custody of the 
child to report, at appropriate intervals, on the status of the child until the 
plan for permanent placement of the child has been accomplished. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M12, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 221, § 15. 
78-3M13. Effect of decree. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
(1) An order for the termination of the parent-child legal relationship di-
vests the child and the parents of all legal rights, powers, immunities, duties, 
and obligations with respect to each other, except the right of the child to 
inherit from the parent. 
(2) An order or decree entered pursuant to this part may not disentitle a 
child to any benefit due him from any third person, including, but not limited 
to, any Indian tribe, agency, state, or the United States. 
(3) After the termination of a parent-child legal relationship, the former 
parent is neither entitled to any notice of proceedings for the adoption of the 
child nor has any right to object to the adoption or to participate in any other 
placement proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M13, enacte< 
1992, ch. 221, § 16. 
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History: C. 1953, 78-3M13, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
1992, ch. 221, § 16. § 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
78-3M14, Voluntary relinquishment — Irrevocable. 
(1) Voluntary relinquishment or consent for termination of parental rights 
shall be signed or confirmed under oath before a judge of any court that has 
jurisdiction over proceedings for termination of parental rights in this state or 
any other state, or a public officer appointed by that court for the purpose of 
taking consents or relinquishments. 
(2) The court or appointed officer shall certify that the person executing the 
consent or relinquishment has read and understands the consent or relin-
quishment and has signed it freely and voluntarily. 
(3) A voluntary relinquishment or consent for termination of parenltel 
rights is effective when it is signed and may not be revoked. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3M14, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 221, § 17. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 221, 
§ 19 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
CHAPTER 3g 
FOSTER CARE CITIZEN REVIEW 
BOARD 
Sunset — Laws 1993, ch. 173, § 5 provides that ch. 173, which enacted this chapter, is 
repealed on April 1, 1995. 
Section Section 
78-3g-101. Definitions [Effective until Chair — Staff support [Effec-
April 1, 1995]. tive until April 1, 1995]. 
78-3g-102. Citizen Review Panel Steering 78-3g-103. Citizen review panels [Effective 
Committee — Membership— until April 1, 1995]. 
78-3g-101. Definitions [Effective until April 1, 1995]. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Committee" means the Citizen Review Panel Pilot Project Steering 
Committee created in this section. 
(2) "Division" means the Division of Family Services within the De-
partment of Human Services. 
(3) "Office" means the Office of Social Services within the Department 
of Human Services. 
(4) "Panel" means a Citizen Review Panel created in Section 
78-3g-103. 
(5) "Plan" or "plans" means the same as that term is defined in Subsec-
tion 78-3f-103(3). 
History: C. 1953, 78-3g-101, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 173, *i 6 
1993, ch. 173, § 2. makes the act effective on July 1, 1993. 
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ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK #6183 
Blakelock and Stringer, P.A. 
Attorneys for Appellee 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANET BOWCUT (deceased), and 
HELEN JENSEN, individually 
and as the Guardian and 
Conservator of the minor child 
DAVID C. BOWCUT, 
Appellee, 
vs. 
DON LESLIE BOWCUT, 
Appellants. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
APPELLEE'S MOTION TO AFFIRM AND 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
CASE NO. 940361-CA 
COMES NOW the Appellee, by and through her counsel of record 
and as for a Memorandum In Response to Request for Summary 
Disposition and Memorandum in Support of Appellee's Motion To 
Affirm the Order and In Support of Motion For Sanctions, submits 
the following: 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT 
Motion for Summary Disposition, in The Utah Court of Appeals, 
requesting Summary Disposition of the Order on Ruling: Child 
support, of Judge Steven Hansen, entered May 13, 1994. 
Specifically, the Appellant requests the Court make a determination 
for Summary Disposition based upon two issues; 
i. The child's custodial status, and 
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i. The child's custodial status, and 
ii. whether or not the court had jurisdiction to make a 
determination, as to child support. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY "APPELLEE" 
The Plaintiff in this matter is deceased, having died prior to 
the institution of the present matters on appeal. The trial Court 
and the Appellant have identified the deceased Plaintiff as the 
"Appellee11, but the true party opponents in this Appeal are the 
minor child, David Bowcut ( with his court appointed Guardian Ad 
Litem ), and the said child's Guardian (grandmother), Helen Jensen. 
For purposes of this Appeal, they are designated and referred to 
together as "Appellee", and separately referred to, as necessary, 
by their individual names, "Jensen" or "David". 
Appellee Moves the Court both to deny the Appellant's 
Request for Summary Disposition, and to Affirm the Order On Ruling: 
Child Support, which is the subject of the above entitled matter on 
the grounds and for the reasons that: 
i. the issue of custody was never raised in the 
proceedings which are being appealed, at the trial court 
level, and is raised for the first time on appeal. 
ii. the issue of jurisdiction was raised by Motion to 
Dismiss, at the November 4th Hearing, which Motion was denied 
by Ruling issued November 24th, 1992. The Ruling was 
dispositive, and the Appellant .never again raised the issue, 
appearing generally in all subsequent proceedings. 
iii. it is the child's right to support that is at the 
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heart of this matter, and neither the Notice of Appeal nor the 
Request for Summary Disposition were mailed to or served upon 
the Guardian Ad Litem (legal counsel) for the minor child. See 
the mailing Certificates to the Notice of Appeal, Docketing 
Statement, and the Request for Summary Disposition, on 
file with this Court. 
Appellee also Moves the Court for sanctions in the form of 
fees and costs incurred in the response to this Appeal generally, 
and in the response to the Request for Summary Disposition, 
specifically. 
Appellant's Request should be dismissed, and, since the 
Appellant has placed "all of his eggs in one basket", the Appeal 
should be dismissed; further, the Appellee's Motions for 
Affirmation of the Ruling (Order On Ruling: Child Support) of the 
Trial Court, and for sanctions in the form of attorney's fees 
should be granted. 
FACTUAL GROUNDS 
1. On or about October 27, 1993, an Order to Show Cause was 
filed in Fourth District Court by Helen Jensen, Guardian and 
Conservator of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, regarding 
the issue of child support. 
2. On November 4, 1993 an Order To Show Cause hearing was held 
before Judge Steven Hansen, regarding the issue of child support. 
Robert Moody, appeared for the Appellant, Don Leslie Bowcutt. 
3 
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3. On or about October 27, 1993, the Appellant, through 
counsel, filed a Motion To Dismiss the Order To Show Cause, along 
with a Memorandum in Support thereof. 
4. Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator, filed a Response 
to Motion To Dismiss Order To Show Cause on November 4, 1993. 
5. On November 4, 1994, at a Hearing on the Order To Show 
Cause, the Court took argument from counsel, regarding 
jurisdiction, child support arrearages and Appellant's on-going 
child support obligation and took the matter under advisement. 
6. On November 24, 1994, the honorable Judge Steven L. 
Hansen, issued a Ruling regarding the issues of on-going child 
support, and jurisdiction. 
7. On November 24, 1993, the Court found that the Appellant 
had an on-going support obligation to the minor child. 
8. On November 24, 1993, the Court found that minor child, 
David Charles Bowcutt, did have standing to maintain an action 
against his natural father for support, via a Guardian Ad Litem, 
and Ron Wilkinson, was appointed as Guardian Ad Litem. 
9. On November 24, 1993, with regard to jurisdiction, the 
court found that the court has continuing jurisdiction to make an 
award of child support, pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(3). 
10. The court ordered a special review hearing to "determine 
the status and needs of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, as 
well as Defendant's [Appellant's] current income level.n (See 
Attachment A, point # 7 ) . 
11. No appeal was filed regarding the November 24, 1993, 
4 
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Ruling of the Trial Court, which included Findings of Fact, and 
Conclusions of Law on the issues of jurisdiction and child support 
obligations. 
12. On December 23, 1993, the hearing was held before Judge 
Hansen, regarding the status of the case and the Appellant's 
financial status for purposes of establishing the amount of child 
support. Appearing at the hearing held December 23, 1993, the 
Appellant's counsel made a request for an Evidentiary Hearing, 
regarding only the pmount of the child support, not whether there 
should be child support. 
13. No appeal was filed regarding the court's decision to 
conduct an Evidentiary Hearing to establish the amount of child 
support obligation of the Appellant. 
14. On March 21, 1994, an Evidentiary Hearing was held, 
regarding the sole issue of the amount of Appellants child support 
obligation for the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt. 
15. The minor child was not present in court, but was 
represented by his Guardian Ad Litem, Ron Wilkinson. 
16. The minor child's maternal grandmother, and Guardian and 
Conservator, Helen Jensen, was also present, with her counsel, 
Rosemond Blakelock. 
17. The Trial Court, at the Evidentiary Hearing, heard 
argument and testimony regarding the Appellant's ability to provide 
support for the minor child, David Bowcutt, and the said minor 
child's need for on-going support. 
18. The Trial Court then took the matter of the amount of 
5 
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child support under advisement, and on or about April 5, 1994, made 
a Ruling, issuing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
concerning the amount of child support to be assessed. see 
attachment B. 
19. The issue of the custodial status of the minor child, was 
never brought before the trial court. 
20. At no time prior to filing this appeal, has the Appellant 
challenged the jurisdiction of the court. 
21. Appellant, either personally or through counsel, made a 
general appearance at all hearings, provided testimony to the 
court regarding his opinion as to the monthly expenses and needs of 
his minor child, David Bowcutt, and in all other matters submitted 
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court, without objection. 
See attachment B, introductory comments, also see point #4, 3rd 
paragraph, attachment B. 
22. On the 24th day of December, 1993, the 30-day appeal 
period on the November 23, 1993 Ruling (Findings and Conclusions) 
concerning jurisdiction and the obligation (not amount), ran out. 
23. On the 27th day of January, 1994 (allowing for a few 
holidays) the 30-day appeal period on the December 23, 1993 Ruling, 
ran out. 
24. On the 13th day of May, 1994, Judge Hansen issued the 
Ruling establishing the amount of the child support, from which 
Ruling the Appellant appeals. See attachment C. 
25. Appellant filed the notice of appeal on or about the 10th 
of June, 1994. 
6 
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26. It is the child's right to support that is at the heart of 
this matter, and neither the Notice of Appeal, nor the Docketing 
Statement, nor the Request for Summary Disposition were mailed to, 
or served upon, the Guardian Ad Litem (legal counsel) for the minor 
child. See the mailing Certificates to the Notice of Appeal, 
Docketing Statement and the Request for Summary Disposition, on 
file with this Court. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANT'S "REQUEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION" 
EXHIBITS A FAILURE TO THOROUGHLY READ EITHER THE RULING, 
OR RULE 10 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 10, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows for 
summary disposition under only three circumstances: 
1. The Appellate court has no jurisdiction. 
There is no contention in the Appellant's request that the 
Appellate Court does not have jurisdiction. 
2. To affirm the order of judgment which is the subject 
of review. Appellant has not asked for summary affirmation, 
to the contrary, he asks for summary reversal. 
3. To reverse the order or judgment which is the subject 
of review on the basis of manifest error. 
Although the Appellant's request comes closest to this third 
category, he does not and, in fact cannot, cite to manifest error, 
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because he requests that the Court of Appeals rule on two issues 
which were not before the trial court at the March 21, 1994 
Evidentiary Hearing. 
It is apparent that the Appellant does not understand the 
procedure and/or process of requesting a Summary Disposition. While 
the Appeal is on it's face made "pro se11, it becomes apparent that 
the Appellant has had the assistance of legally-trained persons in 
the research and preparation of the matter before the Court* 
Appellee asks the Court to look past this ruse, and hold the 
Appellant to the standard of the Rules, in reviewing his pleadings 
and in determining whether to grant the relief requested. 
It is the Appellant's request that his Appeal be decided based 
upon the two issues presented in his Request For Summary 
Disposition. Based upon the facts at the trial level, the request 
for summary reversal of the Trial Court should be denied; and based 
upon his own framing of the issues, the Appeal itself should be 
dismissed. 
II. 
THE RULING WHICH ESTABLISHED THE OBLIGATION 
OP THE APPELLANT TO PAY SUPPORT, AND IN WHICH JURISDICTION 
WAS DIRECTLY ADDRESSED, WAS NOT TIMELY APPEALED 
AND IS NOW RES JUDICATA 
The Ruling which made a determination as to the obligation of 
the Appellant to pay support to the minor child, and which made the 
initial and only determination as to jurisdiction, was made, on 
November 24, 1993. 
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4, the 
8 
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notice of appeal should have been filed with the trial court within 
30 days after the entry of the order appealed from: By December 24, 
1993. No such appeal was timely taken. 
Although both Appellant and his Counsel of record attended 
additional hearings, and made additional pleadings, the issue of 
jurisdiction was never again raised at the Trial Court level. 
While the Appellant might appeal the subsequent Ruling, as to 
the amount of support, the issues of jurisdiction is Res Judicata. 
III. 
THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD, 
ALTHOUGH ADDRESSED IN THE SEPARATE AND EARLIER 
GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING, 
WAS NOT AT ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 
WHICH FORM THE BASIS OF THIS APPEAL? 
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT WAS THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT 
The minor child does not reside with the Appellant (father). 
The child's mother (now deceased) had legal custody under the 
Divorce Decree. However, under the Order of the Probate Court on 3 
September, 1993, the Appellee was granted Guardianship and 
Conservatorship of the said child. While this provided for the 
residential status of the child, and for the need for a caretaker, 
it did not terminate the Appellant's custodial or parental rights. 
In it's Ruling, issued April 5, 1994 (See Attachment B), Judge 
Hansen, addressed the issue of the minor child's residing with his 
maternal grandmother, only from the standpoint of the Appellant#s 
obligation to pay child support while the child resides elsewhere. 
9 
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The court referred to the decision in Durfee v. Purfee. 796 P. 2d 
713 (Utah App. 1990), which cited to Ridino v. Riding, 8 Utah 2d 
136, 139, 329 P.2d 878, 880 (1958): 
The legal obligation to support one's child may only be 
terminated by the legal adoption of the child by another 
person. Riding v. Riding. 8 Utah 2d 136, 139, 329 P.2d 878, 
880 (1958) . Appellant is therefore not excused from his 
obligation to support his oldest child simply because the 
child resides with and receives care from a third party, in 
this case his grandmother. See In re Olsen. ill Utah 365, 180 
P. 2d 210, 213-14 (1947) ("The fact that the maternal 
grandparents honored the request of the dying mother to look 
after the children certainly did not absolve the father of the 
duty to furnish them necessaries.w). 
Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah App, 1990). 
The Appellant apparently is confusing the issue of custody 
with that of the obligation for child support ( which was before 
the court at the Evidentiary Hearing)* There is no question as to 
the fact that the Appellant retains his parental relationship to 
and the legal custody of the minor child (obtained by operation of 
law upon the death of the custodial parent). 
However, the issue of "custody" which the Appellant presents, 
for the first time, in his request for Summary Disposition, was not 
before the Trial Court in the Evidentiary Hearing held before Judge 
Hansen on March 18, 1994, nor is it the subject of the Ruling 
appealed from. As the Trial Court stated, the sole issue was the 
Appellant's ability to provide support for the minor child, and the 
minor child's needs for support. 
V 
v 
V 
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IV. 
JURISDICTION WAS PROPER, 
HOWEVER, THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION WAS MOOT 
ONCE THE APPELLANT FAILED TO FILE AN APPEAL ON THE 
JURISDICTIONAL RULING, AND THEN APPEARED GENERALLY 
SUBMITTING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Trial Court clearly had jurisdiction to make an award of 
child support in this case, pursuant to both Utah Code and case 
law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3, states clearly; 
Every father shall support his child. 
While the Appellant claimed (by way of a Motion to Dismiss at 
the trial level) that the Trial Court could not make a Ruling 
through the original Divorce Decree, the Trial Court addressed that 
issue, denying the Motion, deferring to Durfee v Durfee.796 P.2 
713, (Utah App. 1990), in the Ruling issued on November 24, 1993. 
Appellant has never challenged that Ruling and it is not timely to 
do so at this time. 
Further, even if the Trial Court may have lost personal 
jurisdiction over the Appellant, that argument was waived when, 
after the initial ruling by way of denial of the Motion to Dismiss, 
the Appellant appeared generally, and participated in, the 
subsequent hearings. 
The Appellant did not challenge jurisdiction at the 
Evidentiary Hearing, nor did he appeal the (jurisdictional) Ruling 
of November, 1993. 
\ 
Y 
li 
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V. 
APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO RECIPROCAL SUMKARY DISPOSITION, 
BY WAY OF AFFIRMATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING, 
BECAUSE THE APPELLANT HAS REQUESTED THAT THE COURT DETERMINE 
THE APPEAL BASED UPON THE TWO ISSUES WHICH HE PRESENTED IN 
HIS REQUEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
The Appellant has requested that the court issue a ruling 
based upon two issues (custody and jurisdiction) that wrender all 
others moot11, effectively limiting his appeal to the two issues. 
However, as pointed out earlier in this Memorandum, the issue of 
jurisdiction was not timely appealed, and the issue of custody was 
never an issue. 
Appellee is aware that Summary Disposition is generally not 
available if any one of the issues raised in the Docketing 
Statement needs to be reviewed; and Appellee is aware that the 
Appellant has nominally raised several other issues in his 
Docketing Statement. However, where the Appellant has himself 
identified the two key issues on which his Appeal stands, and has 
asked the Court to summarily decide the Appeal on these two issues 
alone, the general Rule should be applied to allow the Appellee to 
file for reciprocal Summary Disposition, by way of Affirmation of 
the Trial Court's Ruling. 
VI. 
THE APPELLANT FAILED TO PROVIDE NOTICE TO THE PARTIES 
AS REQUIRED BY THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Pursuant to Rule 3 (e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Appellant "shall" give notice of the filing of a 
notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order. 
Attorney Ron Wilkinson was appointed as Guardian Ad Litem for 
the minor child. The Appellant failed to notify the Guardian Ad 
Litem at any point in the Appeals procedure: 
i. Appellant failed to mail notice of the Notice of 
Appeal to the Guardian Ad Litem. See mailing certificate, 
Notice of Appeal (which was called a "Motion To Appeal Order 
On Ruling: Child Support" by Appellant). 
ii. Appellant failed to provide notice and a copy of the 
Docketing Statement to the Guardian Ad Litem. See the mailing 
certificate. 
iii. Appellant has failed to send notice of his Request 
for Summary Disposition to the Guardian Ad Litem. See the 
mailing certificate. 
Due to the failure of the Appellant to comply with the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Appellate's appeal should be 
dismissed. 
vi/ 
BOWCUTT'S APPEAL AND SUBSEQUENT REQUEST FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION HAS NO REASONABLE BASIS IN LAW OR FACT 
AND, THEREFORE, AN AWARD FOR DAMAGES AND REASONABLE 
ATTORNEYS' FEES IS APPROPRIATE PURSUANT TO RULE 33, 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Appellant's Request For Summary Disposition not only fails to 
establish the elements for Summary Disposition, but more 
fundamentally, has willfully mis-characterized the issues which he 
13 
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is able to appeal, or exhibits a blatant disregard of the Rules of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Further, Appellant failed to provide notice to the one person 
most essential in this case, the Guardian Ad Litem for the tdnor 
child. 
This is not a case where the Court should look leniently upon 
an impoverished litigant, who appears without counsel, because he 
cannot afford counsel. Appellant, for what ever reason, chose to 
abandon counsel, even though, as a practicing physician he 
certainly could have afforded an attorney. A reasonable view of 
the pro se appearance may be that the attorney simply refused to 
participate in an Appeal so specious and insupportable. 
The Court assesses damages under Rule 33 "where there is no 
basis for the argument presented and when the evidence or law is 
mis-characterized and misstated". Eames v EamesP 735 P.2d 395, 397 
(Utah App. 1987). 
Bowcutt's Request for Summary Disposition is based upon a 
mis-characterization of the issues which the court should examine, 
and he has made baseless arguments, as well as failing to follow 
the notice requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Therefore, an award of damages and reasonable attorney's fees is 
appropriate. 
Even if the balance of the Appeal is allowed to stand, and the 
remaining issues prove to be worthy of review, the Court should 
award sanctions and damages in the form of interim fees and costs, 
for having to respond to the Request for Summary Disposition. In 
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this regard, the Court should award at least $500.00, as the costs 
and reasonable fees incurred, plus additional sanctions. See 
Attachment D. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellee, Helen Jensen, by and 
through her attorney, respectfully requests that this Court: 
i. Summarily deny the Appellant's Request for Summary 
Disposition (reversal), and 
ii. Grant the Appellee's Motion for Summary Affirmation 
of the Trial Court, and 
iii. Dismiss the Appeal. 
Further, whether the Appeal is dismissed, the Appellee 
respectfully requests the Appeals Court grant an award of damages 
and reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to Rule 33. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of July, 1994. 
/ Rosemond G. Bl^ Je^ Iock 
Attorney for Appellee Jensen 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum In Response to Request for Summary Disposition 
and Memorandum in Support of Appellee's Motion To Affirm the Order 
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and In Support of Motion For Sanctions to: Don Leslie Bowcutt, 
1130 West State Road, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and Ron Wilkinson, 1139 
South Orem Blvd. Orem Utah 84057, on this 6th day of July, 1994. 
TOsenond Blakelc O Q 2 7 
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TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE, RC. TELEPHONE 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW (801) 373-2721 
FAX (801) 375-6293 
FORMERLY 
SSE&JESS'ms CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
..JOHN MOODY 2525 NORTH CANYON ROAD Of Counsel 
COUNTRY CLUB COURT ^ _ _ „ ^ T „ n K T T r 
D. EUGENE THORNE 
PROVO, UTAH 84604 
October 29, 1993 .it 
Rosemund Blakelock I 
Attorney at Law 
Second Floor 
37 East Center Street 
Provo, UT 84601 
Re: Helen Jensen v. Don Bowcut 
Dear Rose: 
Before I begin responding to all of your hard work in the above-entitled matter, 
let me share my thoughts with you. 
Dr. Bowcut has never refused to support his child and, in fact, has attempted to 
work with your client and was assured that by doing so the child would be enrolled in school and 
that the purpose of the guardianship was not for the purpose of positioning for an economic war. 
Dr. Bowcut has paid the child support regularly for over three years, is willing to 
continue to pay the child support, and if we can work towards that end I would suggest that that 
can be accomplished in a manner that would be fruitful. 
Dr. Bowcut has been in the medical practice as a family practitioner for less than 
a year. He has all of the start-up costs of a physician, is a solo practitioner and is not employed 
by a clinic, hospital or other health-care facility. In addition, he is now obligated to begin paying 
back large loans that were necessary to put him through medical school. He has not filed a tax 
return since having begun practicing medicine but would opine that his gross income would not 
exceed $6,000.00 a month at the present time. 
He has and continues to offer David the same opportunities that the children of the 
second marriage have but David would need to comply with the family agenda, which he has so 
far been unwilling to do. If David cannot, and will not, comply with the family agenda then he 
will continue on his own agenda as he is presently doing and Dr. Bowcut would offer his support 
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Rosemund Blakelock 
re: Jensen v. Bowcut 
October 29, 1993 
Page 2 
but not for the agenda that David is presently following. 
My analysis would indicate that Dr. Bowcut should pay not more than $300.00 a 
month. Based upon the social security benefits that David is receiving as a result of his mother's 
death, the $300.00 that Dr. Bowcut would pay would be more than sufficient to support David. 
My information is that David is not going to school but working for an uncle and has income in 
addition to father's support and social security. It may well be reasoned that, if my information 
is correct, David may have become emancipated. 
Dr. Bowcut has been unable to afford medical and dental insurance for his own 
family but when that luxury is afforded, David would be covered. Until then, David, like the 
other children, can receive medical care and treatment in his father's office. 
There is no life insurance in place and none is offered. 
My research is that the delinquent child support that you are seeking expired with 
the death of the mother. That is a cause of action that belongs to her and belongs neither to 
David nor his guardian. In addition, since Dr. Bowcut has made the monthly payments for over 
three years, the larger part of that delinquency is barred by the statute of limitations. 
I will appreciate your thoughts with regard to what we can do to resolve this thing 
before preparing answers to your Summons and Petition and before making efforts to set aside 
the guardianship. My client is not pleased with Helen Jensen and her express representations that * 
the guardianship was for the express purpose of seeing that David was enrolled in school. He 
is not enrolled in school as represented and Helen is now using the guardianship to position 
herself in an economic war with Dr. Bowcut. I suggest that no one will come out the winner in 
the present posture of this matter. 
Your thoughts and suggestions will be appreciated. 
Yours very truly, 
Robert L. Moody 
RLMrda 
cc: Dr. Bowcut 
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it, or if the Court so chooses, put in a trust fund 
for him. But the child support is an obligation 
that is the right of the child. 
The fact of his dysfunctional status at 
this time doesn't lessen his needs in any way. He 
absolutely refuses — and thus the reason for the 
guardianship — to have a relationship with the 
father. He feels abandoned at the point of the 
mother's death. 
But all that being said, coming down to 
today, the status of the young man is still that he 
has needs. Now, he does get the 233 a month, and 
his grandmother's been permitting him to have that 
for spending money and whatever he wants to spend 
it on. I think he's got adequate food, lunch, 
spending money and --
THE COURT: You don't dispute that that 
should be considered by the Court in making a 
judgment? 
MS. BLAKELOCK: No, I think it must be 
considered because that was the point of the Social 
Security system. Was that was a benefit accrued by 
the mother, that upon her death would be as though 
she was paying child support or supporting him. So 
1 I think it should be considered and I think it's to 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
designed to put the Court in the position not to 
have to assess each person's needs individually. I 
don't think he goes beyond or under the guidelines. 
Nothing either side could present would muster to 
that. 
I think the only question for the Court to 
decide is how does it considers the 233 a month. 
If it considers it as income for the mother that 
goes directly to the boy will impact differently 
than if it's considered a form of just direct child 
support. 
I did research on that and wasn't able to 
find direction into how that should be claimed. 
But I think if the Court assumes even that in 
instances where one party works — if the mother 
was alive and working and earning minimum wage, the 
father would pay very little different than if she 
wasn't working at all, because the child support 
guidelines are adjusted to that. One parent can't 
quit work and put the other parent's child support 
way up. It's the equity of the guidelines. 
Therefore, I think the 233 a month coming 
in should be considered not just a lump to be taken 
-- if his child support solely were $800 a month, I 
don't think you'd take the 233 off, because that 
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wouldn't be the effect if the mother were here and 
still living. 
THE COURT: What's wrong with considering 
the 233 as if it was income from the mother on the 
other side of the scale to the father's income, add 
them together, come up with a percentage and 
compute the amount? 
MS. BLAKELOCK: That would be equitable. 
Or considering that the mother had minimum wage, 
and therefore 233 is what goes to him, I don't 
think it matters. I'm just saying that because of 
the way the statute is — 
THE COURT: Well, I wouldn't say that was 
income. I think that would be her share of child 
support. In other words, if there's a total 
combined child support award of $1,000 a month. 
Her contribution is 233. 
MS. BLAKELOCK: But that would equate to a 
certain income on her part. So I think that would 
be a fair way of her percentage of that. What I'm 
saying is if solely his child support is 800, then 
it is an 800 minus 233. 
THE COURT: No. 
MS. BLAKELOCK: But whatever other 
formula --
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 THE COURT: You plug the 233 into the 
2 computation under the formula that is provided by 
3 statute. 
4 MS. BLAKELOCK: Yes, and that would be 
5 fair. Whatever came out, that would be 
6 appropriate. 
7 THE COURT: Well, what's the dispute, then, 
8 Mr. Moody? If we've got that figured out and we've 
9 got his income, there's no dispute about that. For 
10 '93 I guess the issue is whether or not it should 
11 be retroactive to the mother's death. But as far 
12 as '93 goes, why can't we just determine the child 
13 support based on his income and the 233 and have 
14 the two of you figure out the amount and come up 
15 with a figure? 
16 MR. MOODY: We can't, your Honor, because 
17 the guidelines are only advisory. They're not 
18 mandatory. I think the law the Court is searching 
19 for is Durfey versus Durfey, Pacific 2d. 796 — 
20 MS. BLAKELOCK: Do you have one for me? 
21 MR. MOODY: No, I don't — 713. It's a 
22 case very similar where the mother died. In that 
23 situation the Court stated that the overview 
24 section of the guidelines indicate that final 
25 orders of the case shall be made at the discretion 
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1 what the status was. What my obligations were. I 
2 was already told at that point that he wasn't 
3 willing to come live with me. 
4 I asked what my obligations were regarding 
5 ongoing support and future support, and they said 
6 that I had no obligation either way. That the past 
7 support had, quote, "died with Janet." 
8 They said they'd check with the county 
9 attorney before -- she said, "Let me check with the 
10 county attorney." She checked and came back to me 
11 with that answer. 
12 Q. (Inaudible) you to the contrary and your 
13 desire is to support the boy; is it not? 
14 A. Yes, and I was told soon after that -- I 
15 maintained after that I would support the boy after 
16 he stayed in one place for any length of time. 
17 Q. What are your concerns about his staying 
18 in one place for a given length of time? 
19 A. He needs to have some structure. He won't 
20 stay with me. I was hoping that he would stay with 
21 his grandmother. Every place he went we assumed 
22 that that's where he would be staying, but he 
23 wouldn't. 
24 Q. What are your suggestions with regard to 
25 structuring such monies as may be appropriate for 
"\{m n,,s r3~ 
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total then would be approximately $7,040. 
And that his $7,008 would be, you know, in 
essence the sum total, but at least the majority of 
the child support in that, in looking at the 
guidelines under at least 7,000 a month, he's going 
to be giving him 90 percent of the total, at least 
responsible for 687, according to the statute. 
THE COURT: Does that include three 
children? 
MS. BLAKELOCK: No, sir. That should be 
factored in. I know that that goes — there's the 
formula sheet and it's worked out, and the number 
of children, his income, that amount of child 
support that he would pay. Then that amount for 
his children is deducted from his total income on a 
monthly basis. 
Then it's drawn over so that his income is 
base as his gross income minus whatever he would 
pay child support for those three. Then that comes 
down to a subgross, if you will. Then that income 
is the amount, if you consider the three children 
that his child support should be based on. I 
think --
THE COURT: Do you disagree that that 
should be considered? 
y r ^ 
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month. 
more th 
I want 
to the 
j second 
Mr. 
Lan ha 
THE 
some 
MS. 
MR. 
Court 
Wilkinson not only cut it, he cut it 
If. His income is $7,000 a month. 
COURT: What does that compute, then? 
numbers. 
BLAKELOCK: That is — 
WILKINSON: How I calculate it, it's up 
's discretion if they want to use the 
job or not. I assume the Court would use 
the primary 
month. 
the chi 
Which I 
$4,000 
You 
Idren 
came 
a mon 
MS. 
physician. 
part-time at 
income 
burgers 
and he 
job, which my understanding is 5,000 a 
subtract from that the obligation to 
in his present home, which was $1,126. 
up with as $2,700. Approximately 
th that would be computed. 
BLAKELOCK: Your Honor, this is a 
He works part-time at one place and 
another. His full-time physician 
is $84,000 a month. He's not flipping 
down 
goes 
THE 
at McDonald's. He goes to the jail 
to work. 
COURT: Mr. Wilkinson or Mr. Moody, 
both, why didn't you assume the Court could add 
both of 
wouldn' 
those together? 
MR. WILKINSON: They certainly could. I 
t have any objection to that. My assumption 
was that we' d use his primary job. If that's a 
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